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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The dissertation consists of three essays that analyze welfare program participation, food 
consumption behavior of low-income households, and food security status. The first two 
essays consider food stamp program participation and food expenditure. Of specific interest 
is food stamp program participation and expenditure on food consumption away from home 
based on different food security status: food secure households and food insecure households 
(include food insecure without hunger and food insecure with hunger). The analysis is built 
on the observation that households have different program participation and food 
consumption behavior when they face different condition of food security. The first two 
essays consider whether family structure and income sources have different effects on 
program participation and food consumption behavior related to food security. Both studies 
use Current Population Survey (CPS)-Food Security Supplement data. The third essay 
analyzes the effects of demographic variables and income sources (wage income and child 
support) on Family Investment Program (FIP) participation based on Iowa administrative 
data. Iowa introduced major changes to its social assistance programs as the FIP in 1993. 
These essays are designed to better understand whether program participation and 
consumption behavior of the low-income families may be explained by different family 
structure and different income sources. As illustrated below, the behavior of social assistance 
program recipients is far from completely understood. The analyses provided here focus on 
the effects of family structure and income sources on program participation and compare the 
difference between food secure households and food insecure households. 
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Food security measurement 
Food security is widely defined as " access by all people at all times to enough food for 
an active healthy life" (World Bank, 1986). It is an inherently unobservable concept that has 
largely eluded precise and operational definition. Based on the Life Sciences Research Office 
of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (1990), food security 
refers to " access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Food 
security includes at a minimum: (1) the ready availability of nutritionally adequate and safe 
foods, and (2) an assured ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways (e.g., 
without resorting to emergency food supplies, scavenging, stealing, or other coping 
strategies)." Food insecurity refers to " limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable 
foods in socially acceptable ways," and hunger refers to " the uneasy or painful sensation 
caused by a lack of food. The recurrent and involuntary lack of access to food. Hunger may 
produce malnutrition over time... Hunger ... is a potential, although not necessary, 
consequence of food insecurity" (Anderson, 1990). 
The key factors affecting household food security status are shown in Figure 1.1. They 
are influenced by the availability of food, the ability and desire of the households to acquire 
it, its intrahousehold distribution, and the physiological utilization of the ingested nutrients, 
which both affect and are affected by the person's state of health. The person's nutritional 
status also has a feedback effect on their productivity, and the ability to acquire food 
(Senauer and Roe, 1997). Clearly, there is no food availability problem in USA. However, 
other factors may cause Americans suffer food insecure or even hungry. In general, food 
insecurity and hunger are primary the result of poverty. For example, households suffer food 
insecure or hunger because they do not have enough money, adults in the household eat less 
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than they need due to child support. Other factors such as knowledge of nutrition also affect 
the food security status. 
Food avai£ability(time and place) 
Ability of household to obtain ^ vailable food (household food acquisition power) 
Desire to obtain available food (household food acquisition behavior) 
Intrahousehold food allocation of food 
Health status of individual—^ Physiok^ical utilization of ingested food 
^ Nutritional status of individual 
Figure 1.1 Factors Affecting Household Food Security and Individual 
Nutritional Status (Source: Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 1981) 
Although income is one of the main reasons for households to suffer from food 
insecurity and hunger, food security status is not exactly the same as income categories. 
According to Bickel et al. (2000), traditional income and poverty measures do not provide 
clear information about food security. Analysis of food security data shows that many low-
income households are food secure, whereas a small percentage of non-poor households are 
food insecure. A survey of welfare program recipients conducted in California shows that 
"income, even when adjusted for household need and augmented by the food stamp grant, 
poorly predicts hunger or overcrowding among respondents. Families with teenage boys 
report hunger much more often than their incomes would predict, as do families whose 
finances have recently deteriorated" (Mauldon, 1995). Based on the available literature, 
measured food security may provide independent and more specific information on the well-
being of low income households than can be inferred from income data alone. 
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The food security measurement used in this study is based on the Food Security module 
developed by the US Department of Agriculture (Bickel et al., 2000) as implemented in the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). In April 1995 the U.S. Census Bureau implemented the 
first Food Security Supplement to its Current Population Surveys. A household's level of 
food insecurity or hunger is determined by obtaining information on a variety of specific 
conditions, experiences, and behaviors that serve as indicators of the varying degrees of 
severity of the condition. The CPS Food Security Supplement asked about household 
conditions, events, behaviors, and subjective reactions such as anxiety that the household had 
an insufficient food budget, the experience of running out of food, a food supply inadequate 
in quality or quantity, adjustments to normal food use, or instances of reduced food intake by 
adults and children in the household. USDA researchers developed a numerical food security 
scale and a related categorical food-security-status measure to describe the food security 
situation of US households during the preceding 12-month period based on detailed analysis 
from the household interviewed (see Bickel, et al., 2000 for detail). 
To measure the food security, hunger scores are estimated by using a Rasch model 
(Bickel, et al., 2000). The Rasch model is a type of item response theory model developed for 
the purpose of measuring the ability of individuals based on the answers to a set of questions 
(Baker, 1982). The model implies the existence of a continuous "scale," on which the items 
(questions) can be placed based on their difficulty level and individuals can be placed based 
on their ability levels. In the food security measurement, the "difficulty" is the level of food 
insecurity it captures, and the "security" is the scale on which household food security is 
measured. Suppose that a sample of N households was administered a set of m dichotomous 
items, with each household receiving the whole set of n items. Based on their responses, the 
goal is to estimate the severity of each household's food security, as well as each item's 
inherent difficulty. Let ft be the zth individual's ability parameter for i=l TV and <5 be the 
y'th item's difficulty parameter for j=l, ...m. If I/j is an indicator random variable that gives the 
dichotomous answer of person i to itemy, then its distribution is 
exp(0/ - a . )  
P r =  =  ( I D  
The model implies that when ft = <9, the individual has 50% chance of answering 
question j affirmatively. When ft > aj, the individual is more than 50% likely to answer 
affirmatively (see Baker, 1992; Opsomer, et al., 2001 for details). 
Based on the Current Population Survey data and the estimation by the model, a large 
majority of households indicated that within the past year (12 months) they did not 
experience any conditions of food insecurity. However, there are still around 10 percent of 
the households who report suffering food insecurity or hunger (Andrews, et al., 2000). 
The analyses of the first two papers are based on the Current Population Survey's Food 
Security Supplement data which serves a continuing role as the government's primary 
measure of the well-being of the U.S. population. 
Social assistance programs after welfare reform 
One of the purposes of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, popularly known as welfare reform, was to "end the dependence 
of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparedness, work, and 
marriage" (USHS, 2000/ This federal legislation, along with other changes in state policies 
before and after passage, has increased incentives and requirements for families receiving 
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benefits to move into work and eventually off welfare. However, there still exist two major 
types of welfare program based on program benefits: one is USDA food assistance programs 
(such as the food stamp; special supplemental nutrition program for woman, infants and 
children; and school lunch and breakfast programs), and the another one is the cash 
assistance programs run by the States as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 
The food stamp program (FSP) is a central component of food assistance programs and 
provides benefits through coupons and, more recently, with an ATM-like card and electronic 
benefit transfer. The program is designed primarily to increase the food purchasing power of 
eligible low-income households to a point where they can buy a nutritionally adequate low-
cost diet. It is designed to help low-income families and individuals meet their basic 
nutritional needs by ensuring they have the means to purchase a nutritionally adequate and 
palatable low-cost diet. Although there have been some major changes in the program after 
welfare reform, it is still the largest public assistance program that has uniform national 
standards and is available to all households on the basis of financial need, regardless of age, 
family type or disability. According to the data, during fiscal year 1999, the FSP served 
approximately 18.2 million people in an average month benefit of $72 per person (Wilder, et 
al., 2000). 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, renamed under the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
is a major cash welfare program for families with children. There are several goals of the 
TANF program: aid needy families so that children may be cared for in their homes or those 
of relatives; end dependence of needy parents upon government benefits by promoting job 
preparation, work, and marriage; prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 
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establish goals for preventing and reducing their incidence; and encourage formation and 
maintenance of two-parent families (USHS, 1998). 
The Family Investment Program (FIP) is the name of cash assistance program in the 
State of Iowa which began under waiver on July 1, 1993. The program places less emphasis 
on maintaining the incomes of client families and more emphasis on increasing their 
participation in employment and training which was the fundamental shift in welfare policy 
nationwide that culminated in the passage of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996 (PROWA). 
Participation in social assistance programs 
From September 1994 to September 1999, the number of participants in the FSP fell by 
9 million, or 35 percent. Based on data, the number of participating individuals fell by more 
than the number of eligible individuals from 1994 to 1999, the participation rate decreased 
from 74 to 57 percent (Wilde, et al., 2000). This means a decreasing percentage of eligible 
individuals are relying on the FSP for support. More are leaving the FSP, or not participating 
in the first place, even though they are eligible. 
Based on the literature, there are at least two major factors causing program participation 
rates to decrease: 
First, a strong economy helped low-income families find jobs, earn more money, and 
leave the program or not apply in the first place. The strong economy has moved a large 
portion of the former welfare caseload into work. Increasing the number of low-income 
working families reduced the number of households eligible for food stamps and contributed 
substantially to the decline in food stamp use. The proportion of households with incomes 
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below 130% of the federal poverty level declined from 24.2% in 1995 to 19.1% in 1999. 
Adjusted for population growth, this reduction represents a decline of 21.0% in the size of 
the low-income, generally food stamp eligible population (Nord, 2001). 
Second, the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation replaced Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with the work-oriented Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) program. Changes to the welfare system may also have affected many food 
stamp recipients because of the overlap of the two populations. The food stamp provisions of 
the 1996 welfare reform legislation restricted the eligibility of many permanent resident 
aliens and required many able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) to work in 
order to continue receiving food stamps. Legislation in 1997 expanded funding for 
employment and training opportunities for ABAWDs and put in place additional exemptions 
from the work requirements. Legislation in 1998 restored food stamp eligibility to some 
noncitizen children, elderly, and disabled individual. 
Several other reasons for nonparticipation are also apparent in the literature. As discussed 
in the testimony of James Ohls (2001), researchers have found that many did not participate 
in the welfare program even though they were eligible. Some of the answers through 
interview with the eligible non-recipients mentioned in his testimony included " I always 
thought that the food stamps were for people on welfare and for people that were very 
poor.. ..I was not on welfare so I guess I thought I wasn't eligible," " I really prefer not to 
participate because of the stuff you have to go through," " It's the process that keeps people 
from going to apply for them. That's the major thing. That and the environment. You go up 
there and sit for four or five hours, people don't have the patience to do that," " You go down 
half of the time and you sit up there all day sometimes and they say come back tomorrow." 
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Although these quotations are not representative, they help illustrate the kinds of experiences 
which sometimes serve as a deterrent to participation. 
The controversy 
Although the U.S. economy expanded steadily during the 1990s and the country's 
nutrition safety net has helped a large majority of American households achieve or maintain 
food security, there are still around 9.2 million (8.7%) of households, 27 million persons 
suffering food insecurity or hunger in 1999 (Andrews, et al., 2000). Clearly, many American 
families and individuals still struggle to meet basic needs. However, despite the households 
facing problems of food insecurity, the number of welfare program recipients has declined 
during the past several years. Figure 1.2 shows the trend of the FSP participation rate and the 
food insecurity and hunger rate. From the graph, the FSP participation rate gradually declines 
while the share of households suffering food insecurity or hunger did not change much 
during these years. 
16 
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Figure 1.2 A Comparison of FSP Participation and Food Insecurity Rates 
(% of Households) (Source: Andrews, et al., 2000) 
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The question of why some households suffer food insecurity or hunger but do not 
participate in social assistance and food programs has been an interesting topic for both 
economists and policy makers. Beginning with earlier 1980's, the theory of "welfare stigma" 
by Moffit (1983) has been one of the major reasons to explain nonparticipation in a welfare 
program even if the household is eligible. Recently, other reasons such as knowledge, local 
economic development also have been discussed (e.g. Ohls, 2000). However, economic 
development, welfare reform (such as terminal time limits, work requirements, and other 
personal responsibility measures) and other economic and policy changes confound the 
ability of the researcher to easily decompose the caseload decline. Accounting for the relative 
contributions of welfare reform and the business cycle to the decline in caseloads has been 
the focus of much recent research. The Council of Economic Advisors (1997) found that 
44% of the 1993 to 1996 decline in AFDC caseloads was due to the macroeconomy, while 
welfare waivers from the federal government accounted for 31%. Ziliak et al. (2000) reached 
starkly different conclusions by attributing two-thirds of the decline to the business cycle and 
little to welfare reform. There is some indication that the recent decline in economic 
condition has led to increases in welfare rolls. Based on USDA, the households participating 
in FSP in 2001 increased 1.60% (11,7194 households) from 2000 (USDA, 2002). 
Food expenditure 
A significant economic trend in the past ten years is the declining share of consumer 
expenditure on food. Expenditures for food fell steadily from 14.32% of total expenditure in 
1991 to 13.51% in 2000. At the same time, Americans are dining out more often than ever, 
boosting the amount spent on eating out from 37.6% of total food expenditure in 1991 to 
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41.97% in 2000 (BLS, 1991-2000). A number of factors contribute to the trend of eating out: 
a growing number of women employed outside the home, more two-earner households, 
higher incomes, more affordable and convenient fast-food outlets, increased advertising and 
promotion by large food service chains, and the smaller size of American households (Nayga 
and Capps, 1994). 
The share of spending on food decreases as income increases, both through time and in 
cross-section. Figure 1.3 shows the share of food expenditure on total food expenditure for 
households of different income during the past ten years. Based on the graph, the food share 
is 6% less for households with income per capita greater than $50,000 compared to that of 
households with income per capita less than $5,000 in 1990. However, the food share 
difference has decreased over time: the difference is 3.72% in 1999 and 2.28% in 2000. The 
share decreased dramatically during the past ten years for low-income households but 
remained relatively stable for high income households. 
Figure 1.4 is the share of food expenditure on food away from home (FAFH)in total food 
expenditure. Although the share is largest in 1990, the share increases gradually from 1991 to 
2000. At the same time, the share is relatively large for households with income per person 
less than $5,000, and it increases from 31.59% in 1991 to 38.98% in 2000. The share of 
FAFH with food expenditure was lowest for households with income per person between 
$5,000 and $9,999 (23.5 l%)and highest for households with income per person more than 
$50,000 (44.77%) in 1991. The difference between households with income per person 
between $5,000 and $9,999 and households with income per person more than $50,000 is 
still relatively large (around 17 percent points in 1999 and 2000). 
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Figure 1.3 Share of Food Expenditure on Total Expenditure at selected Income Levels 
between 1990 and 2000 (Source: calculated based on Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, BLS, 1990-2000). 
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Figure 1.4 Share of Food Away from Home on Total Food Expenditure at selected Income 
Levels (1990-2000) (Source: calculated based on Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
BLS, 1990-2000). 
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In summary, data from the 1990s (BLS, 1990-2000) show that the share of food 
expenditure in total expenditures has converged among different income groups, because the 
share for high-income groups was relatively stable, and the share for low-income groups has 
fallen. At the same time, differences in the share of FAFH in food expenditure across income 
groups are less pronounced. 
Income and food security status are closely associated. Low income families are more 
likely to suffer food insecurity or hunger than those with high income. At the same time, food 
security status provides a more direct measure of the well-being of a household with respect 
to income categories. The increased importance of FAFH has presented some patterns for the 
design and mechanism of existing food programs. Welfare reform (with work requirement), 
and improved economic conditions are likely associated with the increasing FAFH 
expenditure for low income households, though food assistance programs do not provide 
direct support for FAFH spending. 
The objective and basic results of the study 
The overall goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the effects of income and family 
structure, food security status on program participation, and to compare the different effects 
of local labor market condition on program participation between rural and nonrural areas. 
The study also includes evaluation of food expenditure and consumption behavior 
differences between food secure households and food insecure households. Comparison of 
FAFH based on food security status and work status can provide better understanding of the 
nature and effects of suffering food insecurity. 
The following questions are addressed in the three essays: 
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1) Do demographic variables have different effects on program participation when 
households face different food security status? Does an increase in wage rates, 
working hours (i.e., wage income), and nonwage income have similar effects on food 
stamp program participation? Does an increase in program benefits increase or 
decrease the program participation rate? 
2) What is the role of FAFH expenditures for low income and food insecure 
households? Are there any demand difference for food away from home between 
food secure households and food insecure households? Do income effects differ for 
food purchases between food insecure households and food secure households? Do 
working families have different food consumption behaviors compared to families 
without a job? 
3) What factors determine the Family Investment Program participation for households 
in Iowa? Are there any effects on program participation from migration? How do 
local labor market conditions affect welfare program participation? Do demographic 
variables such as education and family structure affect the program participation? Do 
the effects of child support and wage income on cash assistance program participation 
differ? 
The first essay combines the theoretical approach of the program participation with 
empirical evidence to analyze the effects of income sources and family structure on food 
stamp program participation based on food security status. A bivariate ordered probit model 
is developed and used for the analysis. The results in the paper show that most demographic 
variables have larger effects on households with food insecurity or hunger than on those who 
are food secure. The results also show that wage income and having younger children have 
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significant positive effects on the program participation. At the same time, the effects of 
wage income are larger than non-wage income on program participation. 
The second essay combines an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) double hurdle model with 
demographic translating in an almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) to study demand for 
food away from home based on food security status. The results of the paper not only show 
that working families are more likely to eat out but also show that households with children 
between 6 and 13 have the larger possibilities of eating out than other households. The results 
also show that both food away from home and food at home are normal and necessary goods 
for both food secure families and food insecure families. However, the analysis finds that 
food away from home is a luxury good compared to food at home. 
In the third essay, we examine the effects of migration and local labor market condition 
on family investment program participation using Iowa administrative data. The results 
indicate that migration not only affects the possibility of working but also affects the program 
participation status. The results of this paper also show that the local labor market situation 
combined with geographic information has significant effects on program participation. 
Another interesting finding in the paper is that program participation status is more affected 
by local labor market situation for rural households than for those living in nonrural areas. 
Policy implication 
The analysis of program participation and food consumption behaviors based on the food 
security status in the dissertation provides policy findings, as follows: 
First, family structure is vital information in helping poor families. It not only affects the 
decision on program participation but also affects consumption behavior. The objective of 
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anti-poverty policy is to achieve the maximum utility based on available budgets. 
Considering the family structure in the welfare program reform can help to target those who 
are the poorest. 
Second, having a job and keeping the job is also a major factor in determining 
consumption behavior and participation in the welfare program. Long-term solutions for the 
low-income households require wages, job training and opportunities for the unskilled, 
adequate benefits for those unable to work and/or during transition periods, reforms in public 
assistance and education. Ensuring food security is the first step toward fighting poverty. 
Helping poor families to get a job and to keep the job will help these families to leave the 
welfare program and achieve financial independence. 
Third, although the income elasticity with respect to food for food insecure households is 
almost the same as that for food secure households, there exists a significant difference 
between the expenditure elasticity of food away from home for food secure households 
compared to that for food insecure households. As food expenditure increases, more 
households begin to purchase food away from home, their entry into the market causing 
larger increases in the elasticity of food for food insecure households compared to that 
implied by food away from home expenditures of food secure households. 
Fourth, although food at home still accounts for more than half of the food expenditure, 
FAFH has become more and more important for both food secure households and food 
insecure households. Based on the literature, FAFH, which offers less good nutritional 
choice, usually contains more of the nutrients overconsumed (fat and saturated fat) and less 
of those underconsumed (calcium, fiber, and iron) than home foods (Lin and Frazao, 1999). 
As a result, the increased FAFH may make it more difficult for Americans to improve the 
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overall nutritional quality of their diets, particularly reduction in intakes of fat and saturated 
fat. Because consumers may believe that it is less important to consider the nutritional quality 
of FAFH, nutrition education and promotion strategies may be required to inform consumers 
of the effect of FAFH on overall diet. Increased effects to target the messages to low income 
and food insecure households may be required. 
Fifth, local labor markets are major factors in program participation decisions. The results 
imply that low-income families face more oriblems than higher income families when 
economic situations become worse. To test whether welfare reform is successful, it will be 
very useful to consider not only the decline in program participation rates during income 
expansion periods, but also, maybe more important, is to see how the program participation 
rates change during an economic recession period. The analysis across counties in Iowa 
suggests that the participation rates are highly related with local labor market conditions, 
especially for those living in rural areas. 
The organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2 through 4 presents the three studies 
conducted. Each of the three chapters starts with the research question, followed by the 
literature review, presentation of models used, and results. The last chapter concludes with 
discussion and interpretation of findings. 
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2. FOOD SECURITY AND FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
Despite the U.S. being one of the wealthiest countries in the world, nearly 10 percent of 
U.S. households were food insecure during the year ending in April 1999 (Andrews et al., 
2000). According to the estimation, about 11 million households were food insecure or 
hungry; that is, one or more household members were hungry or food insecure because of a 
lack of money at some time during the year. 
Several food programs, both public and private, are designed to alleviate hunger. The 
major federal food assistance programs include Food Stamp Program (FSP), Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Woman, Infants, and Children (WIC) and School Lunch 
and Breakfast Programs (SLBP). The FSP is the largest one among the programs. The major 
purpose of the program is "to permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet 
... by increasing their purchasing power" (Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended). Today, the 
FSP remains as the major income assistance program available nationwide to financially 
needy households after welfare reform. However, FSP participation declined over 37 percent 
from its peak of 28.0 million people (10.5% of all Americans) in March 1994 to 18.2 million 
people (6.6% of all Americans) by the end of fiscal year 1999 (Wilde, et al., 2000). 
The existence of both food insecurity and the decline in FSP participation rates raises 
the question of why some food insecure people who are eligible for the FSP, do not 
participate in the program. Earlier work by Blank and Ruggles (1993) showed that many 
leaving public assistance programs appear to be eligible to participate. Keane and Moffit 
(1998) propose that there exist significant numbers of nonparticipating eligibles because 
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these households are not making marginal changes in their decisions (i.e. they are at a comer 
solution) and experience disutility in dealing with welfare bureaucracies or from the time and 
money costs of program participation (also see Moffitt, 1983). Recently, Ohls (2001) has 
suggested that households may not participate in the FSP, despite being eligible, because 
they are unaware of their eligibility, face transportation problems or potential embarrassment, 
or have difficulty with the complexity of the application and administrative requirements. 
This paper examines the effects of both wage income (wage rate and working hours) and 
non-wage income (including expected benefits from program participation and other non-
wage income such as child support), and family structure on participation in the FSP based 
on household food security status. Intuitively, we expect households that are food insecure or 
hungry to be more likely to participate in food assistance programs. On the other hand, the 
program may resolve the food insecurity/hunger problem because it provides food aid to the 
recipients. Therefore the relationship between food security status and program participation 
is ambiguous. The purpose of the paper is to examine closely differences between program 
participants who are food insecure or hungry and those who do not participate in the program 
but are still food insecure or hungry. First, we jointly estimate the program participation and 
food security status. Based on the results, we examine two questions. The first is whether 
food security status affects program participation; and the second one is whether and how 
family structure, income sources (both wage and non-wage income) and expected program 
benefits affect the program participation. 
The measure of food security used in the paper is based on a standardized module 
developed by the US Department of Agriculture (Bickel, et al. 2000; Andrews, et al. 2000). 
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The module includes 18 questions (see Table 1.1 for details). Food security status is analyzed 
using cross-section data from the 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Because the decisions on program participation cannot be assumed to be independent of 
the food security status in a household, the distribution of program participation and food 
security status will not be a univariate probit model under the usual normality assumptions. 
Our econometric approach uses bivariate ordered probit equations to estimate both program 
participation and food security status, where the distribution of error components may be 
correlated across equations. 
In many respects our model is an extension of the models and econometric techniques 
that have been developed in past studies of other social assistance programs. However, our 
model and estimating procedure go beyond earlier work in several respects. Most notably, 
because we study the effects of food security on program participation, we must model and 
estimate the joint response of food security status and program participation status, as just 
noted. The advantage of bivariate ordered probit model used here is that it gains efficiency 
because it considers the correlation of the disturbances as well as the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variable (food security status). The multinomial logit or probit models would fail 
to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variables and disturbances that are 
correlated across observations (Green, 1997). In the paper, we introduce our model and 
jointly estimate program participation and food security equations. This approach allows for 
testing the correlation between participation and hunger level and for evaluating the marginal 
effects of independent variables based on the estimation results. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide background on the 
FSP and food security measurement. The following sections cover the economic model; 
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outline the estimation using maximum likelihood estimation methods and provide the basic 
formula used in calculating the marginal effects; discuss the data set employed; and present 
the empirical results. A brief conclusion and discussion are given in the final section. 
Background 
The first U.S. food assistance programs were established during the depression of the 
1930s. The purpose of the programs was to purchase surplus agricultural commodities and 
distribute them to the poor. In the 1960s, food aid programs began to focus on the food and 
nutritional needs of society. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 established the first coupon-based 
system. In 1977, national eligibility standards were established. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act and the Food Stamp and Commodity Distribution Amendments of 1981 
applied for the first time gross income eligibility standards to all households, not including 
aged or disabled members. The Hunger Prevention Act of 1988 raised the maximum food 
stamp allotment incrementally from 100% to 130% of the Thrifty Food Plan. Today, the FSP 
remains the largest of USDA's food assistance program (18 million participants and budget 
of nearly $18 billion in 1999). 
In 1996, as a result of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA), there were several major changes in the scope and structure of the FSP. 
Two types of people were affected by the reforms. First, individuals between 18 and 50 years 
of age who are not mentally or physically disabled or responsible for a dependent are 
required to work or participate in work-related activities to be eligible for the FSP. Second, 
most noncitizens were barred from the program. Beginning November 1,1998, eligibility 
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was restored to some permanent residence aliens (see Kuhn et al., 1996; Rosso and Fowler, 
2000; Wilde et al., 2000 for details). 
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of FSP participation. Most studies 
have found that nonwhite, nonelderly people and those living in low income households that 
include children, do not own their own house, have a household head that is not well 
educated, and include members who participate in other welfare programs are responsible for 
higher FSP participation rates (Rosso and Fowler, 2000). Keane and Moffit (1998) studied 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamps and subsidized housing 
program participation decisions and found that children reduce the household's costs 
associated with welfare for AFDC and FSP (that is, they increase welfare participation), and 
that women who are older, who have higher levels of education, who are in good health, and 
who are white usually have lower welfare participation rates. They also found that 
individuals in states with high AFDC administrative expenses have lower AFDC 
participation rates but higher FSP participation rates. Zedlewski (1999) showed that 
households receiving cash welfare left food stamps at higher rates than families who had not 
been on welfare programs. 
In 1995, USD A introduced a standardized module of questions to measure household 
food security. By applying USDA's food security module, households can be grouped into 
three food security categories: food secure, food insecure without hunger and food insecure 
with hunger (including moderate and severe hunger evident) (Bickel et al., 2000). A 
household is classified into one of the food security status-level categories on the basis of its 
responses to questions in the food security module. The core set of 18 questions provides the 
indicator variables that cover the full range of severity observed under current U.S. 
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conditions for households both with and without children. Table 2.1 presents the 18 questions 
and the relative item scores for 1999. The questions are ordered here from least severe to 
most severe of food insecurity. The household hunger score as well as severity score for each 
item question can be obtained using the Rasch model (Bickel et al., 2000). Households are 
assigned to categories of food insecurity based on the number of affirmative answers the 
respondents have given and account for whether the household has children. 
The Economic Model 
Consider the problem of analyzing FSP participation and food security status. Eligibility 
for the FSP is determined by income, household composition, and other categorical program 
requirements. Program benefits are determined based on formulas that account for certain 
deductible expenses. The unobservable factors affecting program participation are likely to 
be positively correlated with food insecurity. Those most likely to participate are likely to be 
those with food insecurity and those with hunger. Therefore, food security should be 
estimated jointly with the FSP participation equation so that we can have better 
understanding of the program participation. 
Because FSP participation depends on the food security level, the household's utility 
also depends on food security level. Let there be discrete states for the household food 
security status indexed by j=0,l,2. Each state has an associated food security level F}, with a 
2 
probability of /;that F} occurs. = 1. Then the general utility maximization problem 
i=o 
can be written as 
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max U{Y,L,tj ,#P) (2.2) 
Y,P,L 
where U is the individual utility function. We assume 
! > « « > •  
The utility function is assumed to be twice differentiate and strictly quasi-concave. L is 
leisure time. P is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a member of the household participates in 
the FSP, and 0 if not. The presence of the FSP participation indicator in the function can be 
interpreted as representing disutility from participation. 4> is related to the marginal disutility 
of participating in the FSP. If (f> is sufficiently large, a household may not participate in the 
FSP. The disutility comes from the "welfare stigma" from participation (MofTitt, 1983), such 
as the burden of the application procedure (for example, visiting the welfare office), dealing 
with welfare bureaucracies, experiencing other requirements from the FSP such as from 
employment or training-related requirements (utility loss due to the loss of leisure). 
Let C be the money cost and opportunity cost of participating, which includes time 
required for the complicated application processes, intrusive income verification and 
reporting requirements, and the need to be absent from work in order to apply or be 
recertified. According to Dion and Pavetti (2000), most participants are required to return to 
the food stamp office four times a year to be recertified for benefits; moreover, working 
families, because their income is more likely to change, are required to be recertified more 
often than those with a fixed income. Because we do not have the money cost information in 
the data, we only consider the opportunity cost in the empirical study. To simplify the case, 
we assume households treat the FSP benefits as income. Let L and H be the total time 
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available and working hours, the time and budget constraints for the household can be 
represented as 
L + H =L 
Y(H,P) =wH+N+P*(B-C) (2.3) 
Where JV is the nontransfer nonlabor income, w and H is wage rate and working hours, 
respectively, and B is the benefit from FSP participation. According to the program rules 
(USHR, 2000) and following Fraker and Moffitt (1988) and Wilde (2001), the benefit 
formula of FSP for households without elderly or disabled persons can be calculated by the 
following formula: 
B = max[A/, G -  03NI] if  A/7 < Y *  and wH + N < \  .3 Y*, 
0 if NI > Y* or wH + N> 1.3K* 
(2.4) 
NI=max[0, wH+N-(0.2wH+CS+D+I*DC+S)J, (2.5) 
„ fminfl 75, E] without children under 2, DC = { 1 (2.6) [min[200, £] otherwise, 
S = min[ 250, max( 0, /Î - 0.5Cq )], (2.7) 
Cq = max[0, wH + N- (0.2 x wH + D + CS + DC)] (2.8) 
where M is the minimum benefit, G is the guarantee amount, NI is the counted monthly 
income, Y' is the official government poverty line, D is the FSP standard deduction ($134 
per month in 1999), CS is the paid child support amount, I is the number of dependents, DC 
is the out-of-pocket dependent care expenses deduction, E is actual out-of-pocket dependent 
care expenses, S is the shelter deduction, R is the household's expenditure on rent or other 
shelter, and Co is the intermediate net income. For households with an elderly or disabled 
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member, the only difference is that the counted monthly income, AT, is calculated according 
to the following formula: 
NI=max[Q,wH+N-(0.2wH+CS+D+I*DC+SS+M)], (2.5' ) 
Where shelter SS = max(0,/t - 0.5 x CQ) and M is the medical expenses minus 35 ($). 
The indirect utility function can be written as the following formula: 
V = V(wH,N,B,C,P,fl,tj) (2.9) 
The optimality condition of FSP participation requires that the household satisfies 
V(wH,N,B,C,P,t , t j)  > V(wH,N,tj)  (2.10) 
Equation (2.10) implies that case-heads will choose to participate in the FSP if the utility 
gained from program participation is larger than the disutility associated with participation. 
The results can be explained by Figure 2.1, which is similar to that of Moffitt (1983), and 
Fraker and Moffitt (1988). 
Figure 2.1 shows a standard labor leisure diagram with budget constraints ADE (off 
FSP) and BGFC (on FSP). The kink in the budget constraints comes from the benefit 
function. In the Figure, a household achieves maximizing utility at D when they are not in the 
FSP. At this level, hours worked are less than the eligibility hours level Ho. A household 
would choose to participate in the FSP if the disutility from participation is lower than utility 
gained which is achieved at the maximization level of utility at point F. (Because the budget 
constraint is not convex, multiple tangencies are possible. Here we just put one optimum 
point as an example.) However, if the disutility is relatively large and the utility on FSP (such 
as the dash curve as drawn) is lower than that for non-participation, the households would in 
fact choose to stay at D. Thus, a household who is eligible for FSP would not participate if 
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the additional utility from the extra leisure and program participation is less than the disutility 
from program participation. 
Income 
No Program (I) 
On FSP(II) 
HO 
Figure 2.1 Working Hours Choice for eligible households 
working hours 
Based on FSP participation and food security status, all households are classified into 
six mutually exclusive regimes on the basis of participation in FSP (y,) and food security 
status (ya): (i) not in the FSP and food secure, (ii) not in the FSP and food insecure, (iii) not 
in the FSP and food insecure with hunger, (iv) in the FSP and food secure, (v) in the FSP and 
food insecure, and (vi) in the FSP and food insecure with hunger. We use the following 
notation to represent the six regimes (and as illustrated in Figure 2.2): 
Rl: yi=y2=0; 
R2: yi=0,y2=l; 
R3: yi=0, y2=2; 
R4: yi=l, y2=0; 
R5: y i =l, y 2 =l; 
R6:yi=l, y2=2. 
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R6 
R5 R2 
R4 
Figure 2.2 A representation ôf six regimes 
The probability of participating in the FSP based on being food secure is 
Pr(/n=l |/>2=0) = Pr{r4(w//,M(*,5,Q > W *#)('0= U (2Al) 
The probability of participating FSP based on being food insecure is 
Pr(/7| = 11 P2 = 1) = PrC) > V2(N,wH) 11\ = 1} (2.12) 
The probability of participating FSP based on being food insecure with hunger is 
Pr(/>i = \ \ P 2  = 2 )  =  ? x { V ç { w H , N , ( l > , B , C ) > V i ( N i w H ) \ t 2  =1} (2.13) 
Where Vk is the indirect utility for the households facing the six regimes and k-1,2 6. 
To operationalize the indirect utility function, we assume the probability of program 
participation is v and the utility achieved is of linear form 
Vk=awwH+a„N+tj+v+e, (2.14) 
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where aw,a„, are the relative coefficients. The probability of program participation v is 
assumed to depend on income and family structure, expected benefits from the program, 
geographic and other demographic variables. At the same time, we also assume the 
probabilities of household suffering food secure, food insecure and hungry, are a function 
of income and expenditure of households, family size and other demographic variables, Z. 
Therefore the probability of a household in being a different food security status can be 
represented by the following equation: 
/  j  = t(Y(H, P),  / ,  age, family size,  Z) + e (2.15) 
Households can move from being food secure to food insecure or hungry and from being 
hungry to food insecure or food secure. Also, as we discussed earlier, the error term from the 
program participation and food security status has a bivariate normal distribution. Therefore 
a bivariate ordered probit model, as introduced in the next section, is appropriate for the 
analysis. 
The Econometric Model 
In order to account for the six regimes, we used a bivariate ordered probit model. Fraker 
and Moffitt (1988) proposed a model with a bivariate selection model to check the effect of 
the FSP on labor supply. Our model is an extension of the bivariate probit model and ordered 
probit model (Poirier, 1980; Maddala, 1983; Green, 1997). We assume that program 
participation and food security are jointly determined. Decisions regarding a household in 
one or another regime (for example, in a regime with food insecurity and participating in the 
FSP or a regime with food insecurity and not participating in the FSP) are the results of a 
family's optimization problem. 
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The econometric model is described as follows. In order to estimate the program 
participation and food security equations, it is necessary to account for the fact that the 
equations are not statistically independent (i.e., they have correlated disturbances). We 
employ the bivariate ordered probit model. To simplify the equations, we normalize the 
variances of two disturbances to equal unity. Let y'u, y'2i, Zu, Z2/,/3,,/J, be the dependent, 
independent variables and parameter coefficients, respectively. The general specification for 
a two-equation model would be 
y'u =z„A +*,, (2.16 
y2/ ~^2iPl +f2, 
whereE(e,) = E(e2) = 0, var(f,) = var(f2) = 1,cov(f,,e2)  = p.  
* * 
y\t,y2i are unobserved. What we do observe are 
The T's are unknown parameters to be estimated with the /? s. There is one cutoff for T's to 
be estimated in our case. Because >>,,>>2 are observed only as indicator variables, the 
coefficients are only identified up to a scale, and the error terms are therefore assumed to 
have a unit bivariate normal distribution with 
All the households are classified into the six mutually exclusive regimes as we mentioned 
earlier. Let <D(.) be the cumulative distribution function and be the probability density 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
31 
function for the bivariate normal distributions. Under the normality assumption, our 
likelihood function can be expressed as follows: 
6 
r=logI = £i;K9 logP}, where i=0,1 nj (2.19) 
1=1 y=l 
pi=poo = <b(-ZxP\-Z2P1, p) (2.20) 
p i  =p0\ ~ $>(-Z\P\>T-Z2 f32 ,p)-<t>(-Z,/?, ,-Z2 /?,,p) (2.21) 
P, = P02 =<t>(-Z l0 l , -(T-Z2 /}2) ,-p) (2.22) 
P4=P10=<D(Zl/?1,-Z2/?2,-p) (2.23) 
P5=PU  = <D(Z, A ,T-Z202  -p) - <D(Z, A -Z2p2  , -p) (2.24) 
P6 = />2 =Q>{ZX/3X-(T-Z2p2),p) (2.25) 
where Pj is the probability and nj number of households falling into one of the six regimes, 
j=l, 2,3,4,5,6. Ktj is a dummy variable equal to 1 if household i belongs to the j-th group and 
0 if not. 
To calculate the marginal effects, one should note that the marginal effects of the 
independent variables include both direct and indirect effects. Direct effects come from its 
own equation and indirect effects come from the other equations. Following Green's (1997) 
notation, the marginal effects of changes in the regressors can be obtained by differentiating 
the probability of different regimes with respect to the regressors Z = Z, u Z2. Let 
Z,y9, = Zyx and Z2/?2 = Zy2. yk (£=1,2) includes all the nonzero elements of fik and 
possibly some zeros in the positions of variables in Z that appear only in the other equation. 
The marginal effects of changes in Z on the probability of six regimes can be calculated by 
the following formulas: 
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*00 = = -4irZ JI )<D( ZiYlLE^L)yx - ^ (-Z2y2 )0>( Z|^!_^^-)y2 ; (2.26) 
oz V1"/7" yjl-p 
S o i  = ^ - ^ - z m w T ~ Z Y 2 + f m ï n  - < t > ( T -z2y2mZ m-p { J-Z 2 7 2 ))r2 
v - p  V i - p 2  
^(-zinW^^)y^(„Z2r2W^i^h; 
Jl-P2 v-p2 
(2.27) 
S02=~ = -H-Z^)d)( r + ^2 /Z'r')r, + tf-r + Z2z2)<D( Zl/| p(7\ Z^V; 
ôz Ji-p- VI-p 
(2.28) 
*,o =& = ^ ,W"Zf ""f'^')/, -^(-Z2y2)0("Z'^"^)n; (2.29) 
dZ y]l-P VI-/ 
= ^  =  f » ( Z , y , ) ( D ( ^ ~  Y '  *  f * 1 * ) / ,  - < K T - Z 2 y 2 m Z ^  + ^ T ~ Z l Y \ 2  
^ ^ (2.30) 
-^(Z,r,)cD( Z^-+PZ^)ri +H-z2y2)0(Z'r\ ^)n; 
Vi-P Vi-/' 
^12 =^r=^i7i^^ T + Z 2 7 z  p Z '7 ' /k +<y-r+z272;^^ z '7 '  P < T  Z i y i ))y2 .  
dz vi^7 vi-7 
(2.31) 
Let the marginal probability of food security level and FSP participation be 
Pj = Poy + /^y and + /^, + /t2. Then the conditional mean function for FSP 
participation and food security can be written as 
Pro60>, =l|j,2,Z,,Z2)=^,y=0./,2 (2.32) 
•j 
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Pr ob(y2  =j\y l ,Z l ,Z2)  = ^ - , i=0,l .  (2.33) 
"i. 
Derivatives of the various functions shown above give the desired marginal effects. By 
denoting the marginal effects on marginal probability as ÔL and ô}, we obtain the vector of 
marginal effects of FSP participation, conditional on being food insecure or with hunger by 
the following formulas: 
<W. = S"P{pySt (234) 
<^12^2 
(Pa) 1  
 2 (2.35) 
As Green (1997, 2000) suggests, the coefficients in a binary choice model can be 
misleading. Because the model is actually a probability, the absolute scale of the coefficients 
gives a distorted picture of the response of the dependent variable to a change in one of the 
independent variables. Following his suggestion, if the independent variable is a binary 
variable, we can analyze its effect by comparing the probabilities that result when the 
variable takes on its two different values, holding the other variables at their sample means 
(Green, 1997). For example, for the binary variable whether a household head is married 
(q=l), which appears in both equations, the marginal effects on the probability in the FSP 
with hunger can be calculated by the following equation: 
^12 =(Pn k = l)-(Pi2 k=o) = 
mZ xP,-(T -  Z,J),  p)\q = \}~ {<D(Z, A-(r - ZJ),  P)\q=0}. 
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In all cases, the standard errors can be computed using the delta method. Let 
0k(Y\'YiiT,p)equal the marginal effect, which is computed according to the above 
equations. Let 
and Vbe the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimates. An estimate of the 
asymptotic variance for the estimated marginal effect is 
Asy. Var.Sk = A FA' (2.38). 
The Data 
Data and specification issues 
Data on family earnings, income, demographics, program participation and food 
security status are taken from the 1999 March and April supplement of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). The CPS data provide detailed information on demographic 
characteristics, sources of income and food security status for a large, nationally 
representative sample of U.S. households. They also provide information on family and 
individuals and allow us to examine welfare program effects on both families and household 
heads (Connolly, 2000). We merged the households responding to March and April 
supplements in order to gain more detailed income, program and labor force participation 
information from the March Supplement and the food security module information from the 
April supplement (Nord, 1999). 
The CPS survey design interviews a housing unit for 4 consecutive months, then drops 
the housing unit out of the sample for the next 8 months, and brings back the unit in the 
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following 4 months. The sample design was accounted for in matching households across 
March and April. We matched the two-data-sets according to the individual identification 
number, and whether it was in the same rotation for both months. We dropped households 
that were in the first and fifth rotations in April as well as eighth rotations due to the sample 
design. The total number of households after we deleted the observations outside of the 
universe was 25,611 in 1999. The current period, then, is defined as the March-April 
combined period. 
In order to be eligible for the food stamp program, a household must have a net 
monthly income at or below 100 percent of the poverty guideline or 130 percent of the gross 
monthly income poverty guideline, and have countable liquid assets less than $2000 (or 
$3000 for household with an older member) (USHR, 2000; Rosso and Fowler, 2000; see 
equation (2.5) for detail). We defined the eligible households as those households 
participating in a public assistance program (including TANF, General Assistance or SSI) in 
the preceding year, or households with gross income less than or equal to 130 percent of the 
poverty threshold (the respective poverty guideline is calculated based on the household's 
total income in March supplement data and the national poverty line). These cutoffs include 
most FSP eligible and "near-eligible" households. By applying these criteria, we chose 5,543 
households as our sample for analysis. 
The dependent variable for the FSP participation was recoded as 1 if a household 
participated in the program; otherwise zero. Participation indicates any food stamp program 
receipt in the household in the previous year. As mentioned earlier, the food security levels 
(food secure, food insecure and food insecure with hunger) were delineated according to the 
hunger scores on whether the household was food secure, had experienced food insecure, or 
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had experienced hunger in the past 12 months (Bickel et al., 2000). The three food security 
levels were coded as 0,1,2, respectively. 
According to the FSP rules, the maximum benefits from food stamps are a function of a 
household's size, its net monthly income, and maximum monthly benefit levels. The benefit 
is calculated by subtracting the household's expected contribution from its maximum 
allotment, which equals the difference between the maximum benefit and 30 percent of net 
income (USHR, 2000). Because we do not have enough information to calculate the exact net 
income, we calculate the yearly net income (NI) according to the following formula: 
NI=gross income -12*($134+ number of children less than two years old* 
$200+number of children between 2 and 18 * $175+0.2*wage income+$275) 
where the value $275 is a periodically adjusted ceiling for shelter expense deduction in 1999. 
Based on the net income, we calculated the expected FSP benefits for all households in 
the sample according to formula (2.4) and use the expected benefits as an independent 
variable in our FSP participation equation. The average expected benefit per household for 
the households with expected benefits in the sample was $1879.30 per year. In the sample, 
30.06 percent of households had minimal expected benefits. 
Although the CPS has the wage rate variable, most persons did not provide the 
information or give a zero. It is not appropriate for our analysis because those who do not 
work indeed have an expected wage. The expected wage rate is based on education, working 
experience, location, and other information. Therefore, we include age, education, and 
location information in the estimation equation instead of actual wage rate, which would 
have zero for those who do not work. 
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Preliminary Results 
Table 2.2 provides the means and standard deviation of the variables used in our 
analysis. As indicated in the Table, 26.9 percent of reference persons (in the CPS, the 
concept of a household head does not exist. Any of the persons in whose name the residence 
is rented or owned may be listed as reference person) in the sample had at least a high school 
degree; over three fourths (77 percent) were white; and 39 percent of the reference persons 
were male. Of the sample, 10.8 percent participated in public assistance programs which 
include TANF. Over half of those in this low income sample did not own a home. 
We conducted some preliminary analysis on participation and food security. Table 2.3 
shows the distribution of the dependent variables—food stamp program participation and 
food security level. The Table shows that the FSP participation rates increase as the severity 
level of household food insecurity increases. The participation rate for the whole sample is 
23.7 percent. Most households (71.8 percent) are food secure. The program participation 
rates for those who are food secure, food insecure and food insecure with hunger are 16.58 
percent, 39.79 percent and 46.21 percent, respectively. Table 2.3 also shows that 58.1 percent 
of the households with food insecurity or hunger did not participate in the program. 
We also evaluated a measure of the household's use of revenues for food and the 
household's perception of income deprivation. We make use of information on the 
household's estimation of minimum food expenditure needed to feed its household divided 
by gross household income. The average ratio is 35.7 percent. Of the sample, 60.1 percent of 
households could purchase their estimated minimum food expenditure by using less than 30 
percent of their total household income, and nearly 40 percent of households estimated they 
would use more than the FSP allotment of 30 percent. Table 2.4 also provides the sample 
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distribution based on the ratio. From the table, one can see that households with the ratio less 
than 30 percent estimated they would spend less on food than others. The Table also shows 
that around 24 percent of households suffer food insecurity or hunger in the group with a 
share less 30 percent compared with 34 percent for the group with share larger than 30 
percent. 
To determine the household's FSP participation status under different food security 
levels, a comparison of household characteristics is given in Table 2.5. Differences in the 
food secure groups by FSP participation versus non FSP participation were denoted for 
statistical significance. The statistical tests indicate that households who participated in the 
FSP had relatively lower working hours, had higher expected benefits, had more children and 
fewer older family members, had higher probability of participating in TANF program, had 
lower probability of having a head with a high school degree than households who were not 
in the FSP. The results are true for all three food security status. 
Empirical results 
Basic Results 
Our full information maximum likelihood estimates of the full model, obtained by 
estimating the FSP participation jointly with the food security equation are shown in Table 
2.6. In the first set of the Table, the correlation between the two structural disturbances, p, 
was allowed to vary freely. The estimated value of p is 0.30 and the t ratio on the coefficient 
is 13.75; the results suggest that the effects are correlated. The second set of results was 
computed with p fixed at zero. The two sets of results can be used to carry out a likelihood 
ratio test of the null hypothesis that p equals zero against the alternative that p does not equal 
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zero. The likelihood ratio test statistics, LRT= -2[-6231.07-(-6303.89)]=145.64, is distributed 
as chi-square with one degree of freedom under the null hypothesis. The value also suggests 
that the null hypothesis is rejected. The estimated correlation coefficient of the disturbances 
is positive and statistically different from zero. The estimated coefficient measures the 
correlation between the disturbances in the equations and the omitted factors. It implies that 
random error in the determination of food security does indeed appear to be correlated with 
FSP participation. The significance and positive correlation means that there exists a 
correlation between the outcomes after the influence of the included factors is accounted for. 
The results imply: (a) that the random disturbances in food security and FSP participation are 
affected in the same direction by random shocks or unmeasured effects; (b) that the food 
security and FSP participation are not statistically independent; and (c) that the bivariate 
ordered probit estimation of the FSP participation and food insecurity equations is 
appropriate. 
In general, the model performed quite well. Most of the parameters are precisely 
estimated and correspond well to expectation. Households less likely to be in the FSP are 
those with adults in the household working more time, and with more nonwage income. 
Those less likely to participate also include those household-heads that have a high school 
degree, are male, white, able and those who live in metro area. Higher expected benefits from 
the program cause households to enter into the program. Household-heads living in the 
northeast or south part of the country, renting a house, and having more children are more 
likely to participate in the program. 
As summarized recently by Ohls (2001), there is substantial evidence of widespread 
confusion among both potential program applicants and program workers with respect to FSP 
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eligibility criteria. Many eligible families are not aware that they qualify for program 
benefits. For example, some households do not think they are eligible because they own a 
house, have a job, or have income that is too high to qualify despite the fact their job may be 
low-paying or the household would meet the income criteria. Although reasons for non-
participation among eligibles are complex, most of the results are consistent with many of the 
suggested reasons. 
Households whose heads do not have a high school degree, have more older children, 
are non-white, and disabled, do not own a house, and have fewer older family members, are 
more likely to suffer food insecurity or hunger. We expect people to experience food 
insecurity if the household expects to spend a relatively higher share of income on food. The 
significance and positive sign of the ratio of minimal food expenditure with total income 
suggests that households expecting to need more food expenditure (i.e. have a higher ratio) in 
fact are more likely to be food insecure. Households with higher income (including both 
working hours and non-wage income) have more opportunity to overcome the food 
insecurity problem, and are less likely to be food insecure or hungry. 
In comparing the two sets of results (food security status and FSP participation), most 
variables have the same signs. Labor force participation, education achievement, and being 
white have negative effects on the probability of being food insecure and participating in the 
food stamp program. Less income, not owning his/her own house, being disabled, and having 
more children increase the possibility of food insecurity and FSP participation rates. These 
results are consistent with our expectations. The negative coefficients for households' non-
wage and wage income indicate that lower-income households are more likely to be food 
insecure and participate in the FSP. According to Nord (2000), the recent declines in food 
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insecurity and the food stamp caseload were due to rising incomes. He also noted that 
increased food insecurity among low-income households that did not receive food stamps 
may have resulted from reduced access to food stamps rather than from less need for food 
assistance. The results show that some variables have different effects on the two 
probabilities. This is true especially for the family structure, the location (metro) and region 
variables. 
Marginal Effects 
Marginal effects of the regressors on the probability of food security and FSP 
participation are evaluated at the sample means and reported on Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. 
Table 2.7 shows the marginal effects of independent variables on FSP participation and 
food security status. From Table 2.7, most variables have the same sign on both food 
insecurity and hunger, though the marginal effects are higher for those with hunger than 
those who are food insecure. 
Working hours, and nonwage income in the household effects on food security and 
being in the FSP. A one hour increase in working hours per week per household decreases 
the probability of being food insecure by 0.13 percent and of being hungry by 0.14 percent; 
the added working hour also decreases the probability of FSP participation by 0.50 percent. 
A one dollar increase in non-wage income per household per week leads to similar decreases 
in the probability of suffering food insecurity or hunger, and it decreases the probability of 
FSP participation by 0.04 percent. 
A higher ratio of minimal food expenditure to total income decreases the probability of 
food security. A one percent increase in the ratio increases the probability of suffering food 
insecurity or hunger by 2.8 and 3.1 percent, respectively. At the same time, a $10 increase in 
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expected weekly FSP benefits increases the probability of being in the program very little: 
only 0.26 percent. 
Older household-heads are more likely to be food secure. Having additional older 
family members (age older than 60) increases the probability of being food secure by 4.9 
percent. Having more old children increases the probability of being food insecure, although 
the positive marginal effects are larger for those with hunger than those suffering food 
insecurity without hunger. Also, an additional child between 14 and 18 has a larger effect on 
food insecurity status than an additional child between 6 and 13. Although additional 
children between the age of 6 and 13 have the largest effects on FSP participation status, the 
effects of the older family members on FSP participation are not statistically significant. The 
number of children under 6 affects only the program participation. 
A household reference person being one year older decreases the household's 
probability of suffering food insecurity or hunger by 0.15 and 0.17 percent, respectively. And 
it decreases the probability of FSP participation by 0.25 percent points. At the sample mean, 
white households have 6.1 percent higher probability of being food secure, and 6.0 percent 
lower probability of FSP participation than non-white households. A reference person with a 
high school degree has a 3.6 percent higher probability being food secure and 5.3 percent 
lower probability of participating in the FSP than a household reference person without a 
high school degree. A household with being married reference persons is 9.3 percent less 
likely to participate in the program. Other discrete variables can be explained in a similar 
manner. 
Table 2.8 is the marginal effects of independent variables on program participation 
conditional on different food security status. The Table shows that most of variables have 
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larger marginal effects on participating in the FSP for households with food insecurity and 
with hunger than for those who are food secure, especially for the group with hunger. The 
larger effects of expected benefits imply that changes in program benefits have less effect on 
households who are food secure than those with food insecurity or hunger. Based on the 
results, a one dollar increase in expected benefit increases the probability of program 
participation 0.23 percent for food secure households, 0.31 percent for food isnecure 
households, and 0.34 percent for hungry households. Working hours and nonwage income 
also have significant effects on program participation. A one hour increase in working hours 
reduces the probability of participation 0.40 percent for food secure households and 0.56 
percent for hungry households. A 10 dollar increase in nonwage income decreases the 
probability 0.33 percent and 0.47 percent for food secure households and hungry households, 
respectively. 
Additional older family members and children older than 13 do not have significant 
effects on the probability of being in the program. An additional child under 6 increases the 
probability of participating in the FSP by 7.2 percent for food secure households, 9.5 percent 
for food insecure households, and 10.5 percent for households with hunger. An additional 
child between 6 and 13 increases the probability of participating in the FSP by 5.0 percent, 
6.4 percent, and 7.2 percent for food secure households, food insecure households, and 
households with hunger, respectively. 
Households with a reference person who is female, nonwhite, disabled, who does not 
have a high school degree, or who lives in nonmetro area have a higher probability of being 
in the FSP than others. For food secure households, a household with female reference 
person has a 3.8 percent larger probability of being in the FSP than a household with a male 
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reference person. For food insecure households, the difference in the probability of being in 
the FSP is 5.0 percent; for households with hunger, the difference is 29.7 percent. Table 2.8 
also shows that the marital status decreases the probability of FSP participation by 7.9 
percent, 10.5 percent, 40.5 percent for the food secure, food insecure, and hungry groups, 
respectively. Similar explanation can be given to other discrete variables in Table 2.8. One of 
the interesting results here is that the marginal effects in the group with hunger are much 
larger than for the other two groups. This result implies that the FSP participation status for 
households with hunger is more likely to be affected by these demographic variables than for 
households with food security and food insecurity. 
Simulations 
From the marginal effects analysis, we know that family structure and working hours 
have significant effects on food security status and FSP participation status. To further check 
the effect of adults' working hours for the different family structures, we simulate the 
working hours and probability of food security and program participation based on different 
family structure. We consider how the choice of adults' working 0, 20 or 40 hours per week 
affects program participation based on food security status, and for different family member 
structures. Because most families in the sample have 2 children, we first simulate the 
relationship based on households' having 2 children of different ages and compare the effects 
of labor force participation on food security status and program participation. Then we do the 
same simulation based on having four children in the family. 
Table 2.9 provides our simulation results for the effects of adult working hours (per 
adult) on the probability of being in the FSP based on age and number of children. From the 
Table, the probability of being in the FSP decreases as adults' work hours increase from 0 to 
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40 hours per week. We also can see that the probability of being in the FSP is lowest when 
households are food secure among the three food security statuses. The results across number 
of children at different ages are generally consistent. The probability of being in the FSP 
reaches highest when a household has children under age 6, and is lowest when a household 
has children between 14 and 18. If adults in the household do not work, work part time or full 
time, the probability of being in the FSP for the household increases across all food security 
groups as the number of children in the different age groups increases from 2 to 4. 
Given only two children (either under 6 years old, or age between 6 and 13, or age 
between 14 and 18) in a household, as adults choose a full-time job instead of not working, 
the probabilities of being in the FSP decrease for all household groups. The greatest relative 
decrease is for the food secure group. From Table 2.9, one also can see that probabilities of 
being in the FSP are very high when a household has four children. 
Table 2.10 illustrates the implications of other results through simulation. Taking the 
estimated parameters from Table 2.5, we systematically changed the values of various 
demographic and benefit variables for each observation in the sample, and calculate the mean 
of the three conditional probabilities. As Table 2.10 shows, a 10 percent increase in working 
hours decreases the probability of participating in FSP 1.27 percent for food secure 
households, 0.93 percent for food insecure households, and 0.73 percent for households with 
hunger; the decrease in probability due to a 10 percent increase in non-wage income is 2.11 
percent, 1.55 percent and 1.22 percent for food secure, food insecure and hungry households, 
respectively. A 10 percent increase of expected benefit also increases the probabilities of 
being in the FSP for all three types of households. Most of the variables have the largest 
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effect when the households are food secure among the three food security status categories 
because of the relatively lower baseline mean. 
One additional younger child increases the probability of participating in FSP: the 
probability for a household with one more child under 6 has 0.10 larger than the probability 
of baseline mean; the probability for a households with one more child age between 6 and 13 
has 0.07 larger than the value of baseline mean. Families with children usually are likely to 
have access to fewer non-labor sources of income and need more money to support the 
family. The results imply that the household's family structure has strong effects on the 
program participation. 
Conclusion and Comments 
The paper uses a bivariate ordered probit model applied to the 1999 CPS data to study 
the jointly determined questions of the food stamp programs participation and food security 
problem. The joint estimation results show that these two questions are correlated and that 
the results will be biased if we ignore the correlation. The results tell us that the FSP 
participation depends on the food security status. The estimation results also show that 
reference person characteristics such as age, employment status, education, marriage status, 
disability status, home ownership, number of children, working hours per adult are major 
factors which all affect a household's FSP participation and food security level. Households 
experiencing food insecure or food insecure with hunger but not participating in the FSP are 
likely to be employed, have fewer children, not participating in the TANF, own a house, and 
have a male and white reference person with higher education achievement. The share of 
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minimal food expenditure with respect to household income implies that the larger the share 
is, the more likely to suffer food insecure and hungry. 
The results also indicate that some of the demographic variables have different effects 
on the probability of the FSP participation. Marginal effects of being in the FSP based on 
food insecurity or hunger status usually have larger values than those observed for food 
secure households, which imply that households with food insecurity and with hunger are 
more likely to be affected by demographic information of reference persons than food secure 
households. Working hours, nonwage income and expected benefits significantly affect FSP 
participation. The results of marginal effects show that working hour and expected benefit 
have larger effects than does non-wage income on FSP participation. Simulation of family 
structure on being in the FSP shows that younger children have significant positive effects on 
the program participation. 
The different effects of household age, disability status, location among different food 
security status not only suggest that "welfare stigma" is one of the major factors on program 
participation, but also imply that wage rate is another potential factors which cause the 
participation behavior difference. 
There are many directions for future research suggested by our study. For example, we 
have ignored many welfare programs in our model, but several programs, such as Medicaid, 
TANF, and other food assistance programs may affect FSP participation as well as food 
security status. Our model could, in principle, be extended to any number of programs. 
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Table 2.1 Ranking of food security item» and calibrations 
Item Ranking Response Item Calibration 
Food security 1 Worried food would run out 1.490 
2 Food bought just did not last 2.790 
Food insecurity 3 Few kinds of low-cost food for children 3.270 
4 Could not afford balance meals 3.670 
5 Could not feed children a balanced meal 5.040 
6 Adult cut or skipped meals 5.370 
7 You ate less than felt you should 5.530 
Hunger 8 Adult cut or skipped meals, 3+ months 6.420 
9 Children were not eating enough 6.660 
10 You were hungry but did not eat 7.540 
11 You lost weight because not enough food 8.610 
12 Cut size of children's meals 8.790 
13 Adults did not eat for whole day 9.120 
14 Children ever hungry 9.240 
Adults did not eat for whole day, 9.930 
15 3+months 
16 Children ever skip meals 9.940 
17 Children ever skip meals, 3+ months 10.630 
18 Children did not eat for whole day 11.940 
Source: Guide to Measuring Household Food Security, Bickel, et al. 2000. 
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Table 2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Variable Variable Description Mean Std. Dev 
Work hour Number of Working Hours in the family per week 14.009 19.599 
Non-wage Weekly non-wage income in the family($) 232.477 187.069 
Exp Ratio of minimal food expenditure with total income 0.357 0.530 
Exbenefit Weekly expected benefit for Food Stamps(calculated) ($) 24.172 34.263 
# child under 6 Number of children under age 6 0.305 0.655 
# child 6-13 Number of children between 6 and 13 0.430 0.846 
# child 14-18 Number of children between 14 and 18 0.196 0.514 
# older than 60 Number of family members older than 60 0.481 0.649 
Rent Indicator for not-owning a house (0,1) 0.562 0.496 
Service Indicator for working in the service industry(0,1) 0.112 0.320 
Age Reference person age 51.203 20.361 
Age square Square of reference person age 3036.272 2194.549 
Male Indicator for male(0,1 ) 0.388 0.487 
White Indicator for white(0,1 ) 0.766 0.424 
Hispanic Indicator for Hispanic(0,1 ) 0.142 0.349 
Education Whether reference person has at least a high school degree 
(0.1) 
0.269 0.444 
Married Indicator for reference person being marriage 0.316 0.465 
Disabled Indicator for household with disabled member (0,1 ) 0.112 0.105 
TANF Indicator for participating TANF(0,1) 0.108 0.310 
Metro Whether household lives in metro area (0,1 ) 0.685 0.465 
Northeast Whether household lives in the Northeast(0,1) 0.195 0.397 
Midwest Whether household Lives in the Midwest(0,1) 0.208 0.406 
South Whether household Lives in South (0,1) 0.355 0.479 
FSP(y1 ) Indicator for participating FSP, last year (0,1 ) 0.240 0.437 
Note: N=5,543. 
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Table 2.3 Distribution of the sample across FSP participation and food security status 
In FSP Not In FSP Total 
Food Secure 660" 3320 3980 
(11.907)" (59.895) (71.802) 
(50.190)= (78.524) 
(16.583)' (83.417) 
Food Insecure Without Hunger 417 631 1048 
(7.523) (11.384) (18.907) 
(31.711) (14.924) 
(39.790) (60.210) 
Food Insecure With Hunger 238 277 515 
(4.294) (4.997) (9.291) 
(18.099) (6.552) 
(46.214) (53.786) 
Total 1315 4228 5543 
a Cell frequency. 
"Cell percentage. 
c Column percentage. 
d Row percentage. 
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Table 2.4 Sample distribution based on the share of minimum food expenditure with respect to 
total income 
Total sample Share<30% Share S3Q% 
Min food exp per capita 24.359 19.227 32.093 
Share of food expenditure wrt total income 35.727% 15.514% 66.188% 
Total households 5543 3332 2211 
3980= 2530 1450 
Food secure (71.802%)» (75.930%) (65.58%) 
1048 554 494 
Food insecure (18.907%) (16.627%) (22.343%) 
515 248 267 
Food insecure with hunger (9.291%) (7.443%) (12.076%) 
Number of observation. 
6 Share of sample size. 
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Table 2.5 The Mean and standard deviation of Major Variables (Std Oev in the Parenthesis) 
Not in Food Stamp Program In Food Stamp Program 
Regime Food Secure Food Insecure With hunger Food Secure Food Insecure With hunger 
N 3320 631 277 660 417 238 
Work hour 14.747 
(20.266) 
18.176 
(20.011) 
14.653 
(19.489) 
10.118*" 
(16.715) 
10.995*" 
(17.817) 
7.996"* 
(15.528) 
Non-wage 255.661 
(199.773) 
249.869 
(191.624) 
200.994 
(157.097) 
172.427*** 
(136.131) 
179.513*" 
(144.930) 
158.926"* 
(121.514) 
Exbenefit 15.391 
(25.982) 
25.272 
(129.732) 
22.533 
(28.911) 
46.844"* 
(41.040) 
52.902*" 
(44.751) 
43.292*" 
(95.202) 
Child age< 6 0.214 
(0.551) 
0.371 
(0.685) 
0.199 
(0.518) 
0.571"* 
(0.853) 
0.573*" 
(0.863) 
0.311"* 
(0.646) 
Child 6-13 0.312 
(0.730) 
0.529 
(0.885) 
0.332 
(0.736) 
0.642"* 
(1.002) 
0.837"* 
(1.089) 
0.630"* 
(1.005) 
Child 14-18 0.152 
(0.470) 
0.261 
(0.537) 
0.253 
(0.609) 
0.221*" 
(0.519) 
0.341"* 
(0.672) 
0.265 
(0.505) 
Older than 
60 
0.611 
(0.687) 
0.319 
(0.565) 
0.267 
(0.490) 
0.332"* 
(0.560) 
0.228*** 
(0.494) 
0.202" 
(0.452) 
Education 0.283 
(0.450) 
0.271 
(0.445) 
0.354 
(0.479) 
0.220"* 
(0.414) 
0.216" 
(0.412) 
0.210*" 
(0.408) 
TANF(%) 3.615 
(18.668) 
4.437 
(20.609) 
5.776 
(23.371) 
32.273"* 
(46.787) 
33.094"* 
(47.112) 
34.874*** 
(47.758) 
Note: "* difference between those in the FSP and those not in the FSP is significant at 1% ; 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table 2.6 Bivariate Ordered Probit Estimate of Food Security and FSP Participation (Standard 
error in parenthesis) 
With Correlation Without correlation 
Variables Food Security Status FSP Participation Food Security Status FSP Participation 
Constant 
Work hour 
Non-wage 
Exp 
Exbenefit 
#Child under 6 
# Child 6-13 
# Child 14-18 
# Older than 60 
Rent 
Service 
Age 
Age square 
-1.382"* 
(0.167) 
-0.713e-2*** 
(0.106e-2) 
-0.529e-3*** 
(0.122e-3) 
0.159*** 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.033) 
0.064*** 
(0.024) 
0.117*** 
(0.037) 
-0.132** 
(0.053) 
0.280*** 
(0.042) 
0.059*** 
(0.608e-2) 
-0.662e-3*** 
(0.610e-4) 
-1.411*** 
(0.195) 
-0.016*** 
(0.133e-2) 
-0.129e-2*** 
(0.134e-3) 
0.834e-2*** 
(0.789e-3) 
0.266*** 
(0.040) 
0.191*** 
(0.030) 
0.078* 
(0.042) 
0.043 
(0.060) 
0.451*** 
(0.050) 
0.629e-2 
(0.066) 
0.044*** 
(0.681 e-2) 
-0.506e-3*** 
(0.658e-4) 
-1.379*** 
(0.169) 
-0.711 e-2*** 
(0.108e-2) 
-0.542e-3*** 
(0.125e-3) 
0.134** 
(0.062) 
0.026 
(0.033) 
0.064*** 
(0.024) 
0.117*** 
(0.037) 
-0.133** 
(0.055) 
0.276*** 
(0.043) 
0.060*** 
(0.616e-2) 
-0.666e-3*** 
(0.619e-4) 
-1.414*** 
(0.198) 
-0.016*** 
(0.136e-2) 
-0.125e-2*** 
(0.138e-3) 
0.892e-2*** 
(0.792e-3) 
0.254*** 
(0.040) 
0.179*** 
(0.031) 
0.065 
(0.043) 
0.039 
(0.062) 
0.439*** 
(0.051) 
0.011 
(0.068) 
0.044*** 
(0.692e-2) 
-0.506e-3*** 
(0.669e-4) 
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Table 2.6 Continued 
With Correlation Without Correlation 
Variables Food Security Status FSP Participation Food Security Status FSP Participation 
Male -0.034 -0.145*** -0.037 -0.147*** 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.042) (0.050) 
White -0.162*** -0.185*** -0.159*** -0.184*** 
(0.043) (0.050) (0.044) (0.051) 
Hispanic 0.050 -0.053 0.042 -0.057 
(0.056) (0.064) (0.057) (0.065) 
Education -0.097** -0.172*** -0.098** -0.173*** 
(0.042) (0.050) (0.042) (0.051) 
Married -0.055 -0.308*** -0.053 -0.304*** 
(0.049) (0.056) (0.050) (0.057) 
Disabled 0.276* 0.474*** 0.278* 0.476*** 
(0.165) (0.179) (0.160) (0.174) 
Metro 0.032 -0.145*** 0.031 -0.142*** 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.042) (0.051) 
Northeast -0.196*** 0.213*** -0.196*** 0.204*** 
(0.056) (0.068) (0.057) (0.069) 
Midwest -0.179*** 0.049 -0.177*** 0.053 
(0.055) (-0.066) (0.056) (0.067) 
South -0.068 0.123** -0.078 0.116* 
(0.049) (0.059) (0.049) (0.060) 
RHO 0.300*** 
(0.024) 
0 
MU 0.815*** 
(0.023) 
0.816*** 
(0.023) 
LOG-
LIKELIHOOD -6231.07 -6303.89 
Note: Significant at 1% level; "Significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 2.7 Marginal effect» on the probability of being in FSP and food security status 
Marginal effects on the probability of : 
Participation Food secure Food insecure With hunger 
Variables (y1=1) (V2=0) (y2=1) (y2=2) Type (Var) 
Work hour -0.489e-2"* 0.265e-2*" -0.125e-2*** -0.139e-2*** Continuous 
(0.420e-3) (0.394e-3) (0.191e-3) (0.214e-3) 
Non-wage income -0.405e-3*** 0.197e-3*" -0.929e-4*" -0.104e-3*** Continuous 
(0.428e-4) (0.455e-4) (0.218e-4) (0.241e-4) 
Minexp/income -0.059"* 
(0.021) 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.031"* 
(0.011) 
Continuous 
Expected Benefit 0.262e-2*" 
(0.251 e-3) 
Continuous 
# child under 6 0.084"* -0.011 0.51 Oe-2 0.570e-2 Continuous 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.569e-2) (0.642e-2) 
# child 6-13 0.060*" -0.023"* o
 
©
 : 0.013*** Continuous 
(0.951 e-2) (0.874e-2) (0.415e-2) (0.463e-2) 
# child 14-18 0.025* -0.044*** 0.021"* 0.023*** Continuous 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.651 e-2) (0.715e-2) 
# older than 60 0.014 0.049" -0.023" -0.026" Continuous 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.955e-2) (0.010) 
Rent 0.138"* -0.103"* 0.049*** 0.054"* Binary 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.750e-2) (0.803e-2) 
Service 0.198e-2 
(0.021) 
Binary 
Age -0.246e-2*" 0.324e-2*" -0.153e-2*** -0.171 e-2*" Continuous 
(0.623e-3) (0.638e-3) (0.297e-3) (0.350e-3) 
Male -0.045*** 0.013 -0.605e-2 -0.671 e-2 Binary 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.724e-2) (0.798e-2) 
White -0.060*** 0.061*** -0.028*** -0.033*** Binary 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.712e-2) (0.932e-2) 
Hispanic -0.017 -0.019 0.860e-2 0 990e-2 Binary 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.969e-2) (0.012) 
Education -0.053*** 0.036" -0.017" -0.019" Binary 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.747e-2) (0.779e-2) 
Married -0.093"* 0.020 -0.962e-2 -0.011 Binary 
(0.016) (0.028) (0.878e-2) (0.946e-2) 
Disabled -0.169" -0.106* 0.044* 0.063 Binary 
(0.070) (0.065) (0.022) (0.043) 
Metro -0.046*** -0.012 0.567e-2 0.626e-2 Binary 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.727e-2) (0.796e-2) 
Northeast 0.069"* 0.071"* -0.035*** -0.036*** Binary 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.010) (0.946e-2) 
Midwest 0.016 0.065*** -0.032*** -0.033*" Binary 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.955e-2) 
South 0.039" 0.025 -0.012 -0.013 Binary 
(0.019) (0.028) (0.865e-2) (0.932e-2) 
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Table 2.8 Marginal effects on Food Stamp Program participation conditional on food 
security status(standard errors in parenthesis) 
Marginal effects on FSP participation (v1 =1 ) for: 
Food secure Food insecure With hunger 
Variables (V2=0) (V2=1) (y2=2) Type (Var) 
Work hour -0.397e-2*" -0.501 e-2*" -0.562e-2*" Continuous 
(0.377e-3) (0.486e-3) (0.534e-3) 
Non-wage income -0.332e-3*" -0.422e-3*** -0.472e-3"* Continuous 
(0.387e-4) (0.516e-4) (0.560e-4) 
Expected Benefit 0.231 e-2'" 0.309e-2*** 0.340e-2*" Continuous 
(0.229e-3) (0.293e-3) (0.320e-3) 
# child under 6 0.072"* 0.095"* 0.105*** Continuous 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
#child 6-13 0.050*** 0.064"* 0.072"* Continuous 
(0.832e-2) (0.011) (0.012) 
#child 14-18 0.016 0.017 0.020 Continuous 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) 
#older than 60 0.018 0.03 0.031 Continuous 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.025) 
Rent 0.109*** 0.135"* 0.271 e-2 Binary 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.028) 
Service 0.175e-2 0.233e-2 0.256e-2 Binary 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.027) 
Age -0.175e-2*" -0.198e-2*" -0.231 e-2*" Continuous 
(0.549e-3) (0.731 e-3) (0.797e-3) 
Male -0.038*" -0.050*** -0.297"* Binary 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.032) 
White -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.285*** Binary 
(0.015) (0.029) (0.028) 
Hispanic -0.017 -0.025 -0.252*** Binary 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.045) 
Education -0.042"* -0.053*** -0.316"* Binary 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.036) 
Married -0.079*** -0.105"* -0.405"* Binary 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.038) 
Disabled 0.138" 0.157" 0.078 Binary 
(0.062) (0.068) (0.099) 
Metro -0.043*** -0.058"* -0.289*** Binary 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.028) 
Northeast 0.073*** 0.103*** -0.048 Binary 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.046) 
Midwest 0.023 0.038 -0.159*** Binary 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.046) 
South 0.038" 0.031 -0.128"* Binary 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.038) 
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Table 2.9 Predicted effects of working hours on FSP participation based on food 
security status 
Probability of participation in FSP for 
Status 0 10 20 30 40 
Baseline mean (without children) 
Food security 0.302 0.253 0.208 0.168 0.134 
Food insecurity 0.450 0.394 0.341 0.291 0.244 
Food insecure with hunger 0.568 0.511 0.454 0.397 0.343 
Food security 
Two children with age 0-5 0.460 0.448 0.391 0.335 0.283 
Two children with age 6-13 0.395 0.384 0.329 0.278 0.230 
Two children with age 14-18 0.301 0.291 0.243 0.200 0.161 
Four children with age 0-5 0.669 0.658 0.602 0.544 0.485 
Four children with age 6-13 0.541 0.530 0.471 0.413 0.357 
Four children with age 14-18 0.342 0.331 0.280 0.233 0.191 
Food insecurity 
Two children with age 0-5 0.618 0.607 0.551 0.495 0.439 
Two children with age 6-13 0.549 0.537 0.481 0.425 0.370 
Two children with age 14-18 0.442 0.430 0.376 0.323 0.274 
Four children with age 0-5 0.799 0.791 0.748 0.701 0.650 
Four children with age 6-13 0.686 0.676 0.623 0.569 0.513 
Four children with age 14-18 0.479 0.467 0.412 0.358 0.306 
With hunger 
Two children with age 0-5 0.724 0.714 0.663 0.610 0.554 
Two children with age 6-13 0.663 0.653 0.598 0.542 0.485 
Two children with age 14-18 0.563 0.552 0.494 0.437 0.381 
Four children with age 0-5 0.871 0.865 0.831 0.793 0.750 
Four children with age 6-13 0.784 0.776 0.730 0.681 0.628 
Four children with age 14-18 0.604 0.593 0.536 0.478 0.421 
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Table 2.10 Effects of changes in exogenous variables on probability of FSP participation 
Probability of being in FSP 
Food secure Food insecure With hunger 
Baseline mean 0.337 0.488 0.606 
10% increase in working hour 0.333= 0.484 0.601 
(-1.271)" (-0.925) (-0.731) 
10% increase in non-wage income 0.330 0.481 0.598 
(-2.109) (-1.546) (-1.221) 
10% increase in expected benefit 0.351 0.503 0.620 
(4.056) (3.087) (2.373) 
One additional child age 0-5 0.439 0.595 0.704 
(30.404) (21.848) (16.305) 
One additional child age 6-13 0.407 0.560 0.674 
(20.741) (14.760) (11.267) 
One additional child age 14-18 0.358 0.507 0.625 
(6.392) (3.816) (3.244) 
One additional older family member 0.362 0.522 0.636 
(7.459) (6.900) (4.957) 
3 Cell probability 
6 Cell increase from baseline (in %). 
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3. FOOD SECURITY AND DEMAND FOR FOOD AWAY FROM HOME 
Introduction 
One of the most dramatic changes in consumer food demand in the last 25 years is the 
trend towards greater consumption of food away from home (FAFH). Expenditures on FAFH 
represented 42 percent of the average household food expenditure in 1999 (BLS, 2001). 
During 1996-99 period, spending on FAFH increased 22.4%; spending on food at home 
increased 4.1%. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data also show that two-person 
consumer units had the greatest increase in spending on food at home, and four-person 
consumer units had the greatest increase for FAFH. Although food at home spending still 
accounts for the larger share of total food expenditure, the consumption of purchased meals 
away from home has become more and more important relative to food consumed at home. A 
growing economy, rising numbers of dual-income families and the wide availability of fast-
food outlets have led to steady increases in spending on FAFH. 
Based on the results from CES in 1999, households with income per capita before tax 
less than $5000 spent 16% of their total expenditure on food, and spent 37.21% of food 
expenditure in FAFH; households with income per capita before tax between $10,000 and 
$29,999 spent around 15% of their total expenditure on food, but with different expenditure 
on FAFH: 32% for those with per capita income between $10,000 and $14,999, 34% for 
income per capita between $15,000 and $19,999,38% for income per capita between 
$20,000 and $29,999. The share of food expenditure spent on FAFH was 50.41% for those 
with income per capita larger than $70,000 group. The numbers confirm that the share of 
food expenditure decreases as income increases but the share of FAFH increases as income 
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increases. The results imply that consumption behavior is different for the different income 
groups, yet FAFH is an important component for all income groups. Some authors try to 
compare spending behavior differences based on income distribution. For example, Share 
and Abdel-Ghany (1999) found significant spending differences between the poor and 
nonpoor for food at home, housing, health, transportation, and other expenses. However, they 
did not find significant differences in spending between poor and non-poor for food away 
from home. 
Based on Bickel, et al. (2000), "traditional income and poverty measures do not provide 
clear information about food security, even though food insecurity and hunger stem from 
constrained financial resources." Although being a low-income household does not mean the 
household is food insecure, income is one of the main factors that cause households suffer 
food insecure or even hungry. The probability of being food insecure for low-income 
households is larger than that for high-income households. The consumption behaviors are 
also likely to be different between households with food insecurity and other households. For 
the food insecure households, people are first and foremost motivated to satisfy their basic 
physiological needs for food in the context of the traditional food preferences, the lowest 
level of the Maslow's hierarchy of needs pyramid. In contrast, people in food secure 
households are motivated by factors higher on the pyramid. Their attitudes towards food may 
be understood by considering food choices in the context of safety, belongingness, esteem, 
and even self-actualization and self-fulfillment needs, which is the top of Maslow's hierarchy 
(see Belonax, 1997 for detail). The different needs between food secure families and food 
insecure families imply that choices between consumption at home and away from home 
may be decided by different factors. FAFH includes meals or snacks where food preparation 
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is performed by a commercial food facility such as restaurants, fast food places, cafeterias, 
and vending machines. Households are more likely to chose FAFH if they are food secure, 
partly because expenditure on FAFH includes a service component (tip) and may involve 
increased commuting (travel) expenses. 
Objectives of this study are to focus attention on the effects of family structure on 
FAFH, and compare the different roles of family structure, food stamp program participation, 
price and total food expenditure between food secure households and food insecure 
households. This focus is made possible by the recent collection of data on the food security 
status in a large, national survey of households. 
A number of studies on food consumption at home and away from home have been 
conducted. Most of them attempt to figure out the effects of income on food expenditure 
away from home and food at home (Houthakker and Taylor, 1970; Lamm, 1982; Lee and 
Brown, 1986). Lamm (1982) estimated income elasticity of FAFH expenditure is 0.11 using 
the U.S. Department of Commerce data, McCracken and Brandt (1987) estimated income 
elasticity of probability for FAFH is 0.19 and income elasticity is 0.24 based on the National 
Wide Food Consumption Survey data in 1977, and Yen (1993) estimated probability 
elasticity and expenditure elasticity of income is 0.07 and 0.36, respectively. At the same 
time, Yen (1993) also showed that FAFH probability and expenditure elasticities of 
household size is 0.02 and 0.24, respectively. Also, Bryne, Capps, and Saha (1996) showed 
income elasticities to be about 0.20. All in all, these studies have demonstrated through 
estimating sample expenditure elasticities that FAFH can be classified as a necessity rather 
than a luxury good. Kinsey (1982) evaluated income elasticities based on different income 
groups and found that the elasticities increased as income increases. She showed that income 
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earned by wives working full time did not increase the marginal propensity to consume 
FAFH, while income earned by part-time working wives and children, asset income 
increased this propensity. Many studies also checked the effects of demographic, social, and 
economic factors on FAFH (Prochaska and Schrimper 1973; McCracken and Brandt, 1987; 
Lee and Brown, 1986 ; Yen, 1993 ; Kinsey, 1982; Nayga and Capps, 1992). These studies 
also found that female labor participation rate and opportunity cost of time is a driving force 
behind increased consumption of FAFH. For example, Jensen and Yen (1996) showed that 
wife's employment has a positive effect on the probability of eating out and level of lunch 
and dinner FAFH expenditure although not breakfast FAFH expenditures. 
Some papers have evaluated the effects of food stamp program participation on food 
expenditure. Studies (Lee and Brown, 1986; Fraker, Martini, and Ohls, 1995; Deaton and 
Paxson, 1998) generally found that the food stamp program has strong effects on food 
expenditure. However, whether food stamps exert more than a standard income effect on 
food expenditure or not is still less well established. The purpose of FSP is to improve food 
availability and access so as to enhance food security. The hypothesis here is that the quality, 
quantity, or both of food consumed by FSP participants should exceed that of 
nonparticipants. At the same time, because the FSP augments participants' purchasing power 
through the provision of food benefits (coupons or benefit transfers), it decreases the 
probability of eating out and consumption of FAFH. Including a food stamp dummy in the 
analysis allows us to test whether households participating in FSP are more likely to eat at 
home. 
The main difference between this study and others is to compare the effects of family 
structure, food price and income on FAFH consumption for food secure households with 
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those of food insecure households. As we discussed earlier, many low-income households are 
food secure, whereas some non-poor households are food insecure. The reasons may include 
unexpected changes in circumstances, variations in household decisions about how to handle 
competing demands for limited resources, and geographic patterns of relative costs and 
availability of food and other basic necessities. The food security measure provides 
independent, more specific information on this dimension of well-being than can be inferred 
from income data alone (Bickel, et al., 2000). The difference between income and food 
security status provide an opportunity to analysis FAFH based on food security status instead 
of income levels. We mainly perform two analysis, one focusing on the effects of family 
structure and market characteristic variables on the share of FAFH expenditure, the other 
focusing on the effects on probability of eating out. In each case, we segment households by 
type of food security. To maintain consistency with economic theory, the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (LA/AIDS) was considered for the study. In addition, translating procedures 
were used to incorporate demographic variables into the food demand system. 
This study uses data from the 1999 CPS-April food security supplement to estimate 
demand for FAFH, and food at home. The survey data make possible the estimation of 
disaggregate income and price elasticities for specific population groups, allow the 
opportunity to analyze the importance of socioeconomic and demographic factors on 
consumption decisions, and provide a large number of observations so there is not a problem 
of degrees of freedom. However, because price information is not collected in the survey, 
estimation of price parameters make use of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for different 
regions based on consolidated MSA code. The CPI for each of the above categories was 
matched with household observations by month and region. Households are classified on the 
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basis of estimated food security scales. The food security scales are based on a set of 18 
survey items included in the CPS Food Security Supplement that ask respondents directly 
about their behavior and food choices conditioned on financial constraints. Based their 
responses, households are classified into three categories: food secure, food insecure without 
hunger, and food insecure with hunger (see Bickel et al., 2000 for details). We combined 
households in the categories of food insecurity without hunger and food insecurity with 
hunger as the food insecure group. 
The following sections present the economic and the econometric models, describe the 
data source and sample, provide empirical estimation results, and summarize major findings. 
The Basic Model 
In studies of food consumption, the assumption of weak separability of the utility 
function is often invoked, that is, it is assumed that the expenditures of a household can be 
grouped into two subgroups (expenditures on food and expenditures on nonfood) in such a 
way that the marginal rate of substitution between food items (food away from home and 
food at home) is independent of the level of any nonfood demand. This assumption allows 
the household's utility maximization problem to be decomposed into two separate problems, 
which can be thought of as two sequential stages of a decision-making process. The first 
stage is the determination of the broad group expenditure allocation that maximizes utility. 
Given this expenditure allocation, the second stage determines within the food group 
allocation by maximization the utility of attaining the overall level of the food demand for 
that group. 
Let the utility function be 
65 
f/ 
= £/(ôll,Ô12»--»ôl,ml.Ô21»Ô22 (?2,iw2) (3.1) 
Where U is the utility function, Qij represents the demand level of different food and non­
food products. Assume that U is weakly separable with respect to the Q/ and Q2, where 
Qt={QthQa,—,Qt.mt}. t=l,2- Goldman and Uzawa (1964) have shown that (/can then be 
written as 
It can easily be shown that there exists a group expenditure function e,(Qt, UJ given by 
* mt * 
et (pt ,(4) = min £ PitQit subject to U,(QU, ...,Qi,mi)>Ut (3.3) 
z=l 
where P, is the vector (Pn,Pi2,—,Pi.mt) and P„ is the price of different products i in group /. 
Equation (3.3) allows Hicksian food demand equations to be derived easily using 
Since the LA/AIDS can be interpreted as a first-order approximation to any demand 
system, its use allows tractable estimation of the second stage (i.e. wi thin-group) allocation 
process without the imposition of restrictive a priori assumption with regard to expenditure 
effects. Assume that the group food expenditure function satisfy the AIDS formulation, i.e., 
that they can be written as 
U()=U(U/( QO.Uif Q2)) (3.2) 
Qit - Qi(Pt,ut ) - -J-Ofit (3.4) 
H'it = a it + Pit log(^-) + ly Yijt log Pjt 
logPt =aoit +!/«// log/%, jYijt logPjt logPit (3.5) 
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where w,, was the expenditure share of the ith commodity in group t, e, is total food 
expenditures in group t, P„, Pjt is the price of the ith and jth commodity in group t, 
respectively. 
Differences in household behavior depend not only on prices and income but also on 
household characteristics and demographic factors. As we discussed earlier, FAFH 
expenditures made by household members are thought to differ by the age and gender of the 
household members. Previous studies have used demographic translation for household 
composition, which yields an estimated parameter for each age-gender classification (Heien 
and Wessells, 1990; McCracken and Brandt, 1987; Byrne, Capps and Saha, 1996). These 
relationships can be estimated by adding parameters to the demand system (Pollak and 
Wales, 1980, 1981; Ray's, 1982; Rossi, 1988). 
Because adults, children, and older family members, and adults working status are likely 
to have different effects on food expenditure, we include these variables as demographic 
variables. 
Let 
t = Z.I.(Aijk+0j Â2 j + a\ jK\ j + «2 jK 2 j + a3 jK3 j ) (3.6) 
j k 
be the effective household size. Where is each number between zero and one that 
indicates the fraction of an adult each child or older family member represents, respectively, 
i=l,2,3; j=l,2; k=l,2. 
Here we assume that households include /*//* adults age between 19 and 64, A j j  adults 
older than 64, AT/y children at age less than 6, ATjy children age between 6 and 13, and Ky age 
between 14 and 18, wherey'=l,2 and k= 1,2, respectively, andy'=l and 2 refers female and 
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male, and A=1 and 2 refers to work and non-work. Increases in the fraction of children and 
substitution of children for adults are likely to decrease food demand per person in the 
household. We also assume that adults between 19 and 64 are in the working population; 
being in the labor force will affect the food consumption decision. We enumerate the number 
of working family members. Households with more working members are likely to have 
different food expenditure patterns because workers may eat FAFH more often than other 
non-working families; Expenditure on FAFH are likely to increase both because of a positive 
"direct" effects as well as increased payments for services in restaurant meal. Restaurant 
meals include a service component (Beaton and Paxson, 1998). 
To check whether food assistance programs exert more than a standard income effect on 
food expenditure (Moffitt, 1989; Fraker, Martini, and Ohls, 1995), a dummy variable 
indicating whether any one of the family members participated in the food stamp program in 
the past year can be included among the demographic and socioeconomic variables. Other 
dummy variables such as region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), urbanization, race, 
education, hispanic, white, and marriage status and age of male or female heads are used to 
control for the differences in consumer behavior. 
Demographic translating is used to incorporate the demographic and socioeconomic 
variables into the LA/AIDS model so that 
ait =KiOt + Z *ist ' (3.7) 
s 
where the Ns are the demographic variables, as described in the previous several paragraphs 
(s=l d). 
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For estimation purposes, as often done, the price index P was approximated using the 
Stone's price index, 
log P* = I/ïvzV log Pit. (3.8) 
where w,y is the mean of budget share of different food expenditures in group t. The resulting 
system is 
wit =*70/ + Pit log(-t) + I jYijt l°g Pjt +2 sVstNs 
Pt (3.9) 
The basic demand restrictions were expressed in terms of the model's coefficients 
1)1/*70* = 1 ÏLiYijt = IiPit = liKist = 0 (adding up) 
2)E jYijt = 0 (homogeneity) 
l)Yijt=Yjit (symmetry) (3 1Q) 
The unconditional own, cross-price, and expenditure elasticities for the LA/AIDS 
system are 
[Yijt ~ Pit wi + Pit Pjt log(-^r)] 
Pt eij = 
Wi 
y Tl if i 
s a, where ôjj = \ J (3.11) 
J J |0 o.w. 
e , = ^ U l .  
Wi 
(3.12) 
Methodology 
Zero problem issue in FAFH 
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The use of CPS data on FAFH allows examination of the effects of detailed 
demographic variables on consumption decisions. However, zero observations in the 
dependent variable present new estimation problems with cross-section survey data. 
There are several methods used for estimating the demand for FAFH in the presence of 
a large number of zero observations. These methods include Tobit model (McCracken and 
Brandt,1987), double-hurdle model (Yen, 1993 and 1996; Jensen and Yen, 1996), 
Heckman's two-stage procedure (Park and Capps, 1997; ), log-linear model (Pol and Pak, 
1995), and switching regression analysis (Lee and Brown, 1986; Manrique and Jensen, 
1998). 
Although the Tobit model has been used broadly in empirical applications and has 
commonly been estimated with homoskedastic and truncated normal errors, as Lin and 
Schmidt (1983) mention, the use of the Tobit model is extremely restrictive due to two 
reasons: first, it assumes that any variables which increase the probability of a non-zero value 
must also increase the means of the positive values; second, it links the shape of the 
distribution of the positive observations and the probability of a positive observation. Thus, 
the assumptions may not be true for the case when some of the zeros are a result of 
'nonparticipation' decisions (Cragg, 1971). 
Heckman's two-stage estimation assumes that the zero expenditures result from either 
standard corner solutions or infrequency of purchases (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). Let 
yu=Xi/?i+utl; ya=X2/?2+ut2. 
Here we observed only the sign of yg, and we observe yn if and only if ya>0. If uit=u2t and 
P\=P2, the model is the same as the Tobit model. However, the model does not apply well to 
data sets with characteristics when: "the observed values of yti need not be positive, in the 
sense that the model implies a non-zero probability of observed yu<0; and the unobserved yn 
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is literally unobserved, rather than observed as equal to zero" (Lin and Schmit, 1983). 
Similar comments apply to other models. 
In our case, Heckman's model applies when some households' food consumption is 
literally unknown; The Tobit model or Double-hurdle model applies when, for some 
households, consumption is known to be zero. Although The Current Population Surveys 
(CPS) provides only information on expenditures observed for a one-week period, it provides 
individual intake data and therefore infrequency of purchase is not so much of a problem. 
Noting the concern with the Tobit model, Heckman's two-stage and other approaches, 
Cragg's double-hurdle model is the most suitable model for our data set. The model accounts 
for zero expenditure from purchase infrequency; moreover, it considers zero is a meaningful 
value of the dependent variable, and allows for different effects of a variable on participation 
and consumption decisions. 
In our FAFH case, the first hurdle arises from the participation in the FAFH market, and 
the second hurdle comes from whether they indeed consume the food. The double-hurdle 
model features two stochastic processes that determine the probability and conditional level 
of consumption, and accounts for zero observations resulting from true nonconsumption 
determined by economic and market determinants (corner solutions) as well as other factors 
such as "conscientious abstention" (Pudney, 1988). 
Empirical specification 
Based on the economic model described in the last section, the demand for FAFH is 
analyzed in the following two steps: 
First, a food expenditure equation is estimated based on a linear Engel relationship, i.e., 
Expi=a+bx[NQ, 1=1,2,...,n (3.14) 
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where Exp\ and INC, represent the z'th household's food expenditures and income, 
respectively; and a and b are parameters. To control for differences in family structure and 
other demographic information that vary across households, a number of variables specified 
earlier were added to the equation. The completed model estimated was 
Expi =aQ+'£.akski +&x/7VCy +£,• (3.15) 
k 
where the s's are demographic and socioeconomic variables, the a's and b's are parameters 
to be estimated, and e is the usual disturbance term (the c's are independent N(0,o^)). Note 
that the residual 4 may be heteroscedastic (Maddala, 1983, pp. 225-226). Weighted least 
squares method is used to estimate (3.15). 
Second, we estimate the demand for FAFH and food at home based on the total food 
expenditure. Given the adding-up restriction of the LA/AIDS share equations, it is only 
necessary to estimate one equation of the two equation system. The food at home equation is 
dropped from the estimation, with the parameters of the food at home equation estimated 
from the symmetry and homogeneity conditions. 
The double-hurdle model is described here. As we discussed earlier, households have a 
choice in how they buy food for consumption. For households that consume food away from 
home, there exist two hurdles: to participate in the market, and to actually consume. The first 
hurdle is a probit mechanism for the consumption decision and the second hurdle is a Tobit 
mechanism. Both hurdles are assumed to be linear in their parameters (a,/7), with additive 
disturbance terms u and v randomly distributed with a bivariate normal distribution. 
Let X and Z be the regressors that influence participation and consumption. The double 
hurdle modle, developed by Cragg and Atkinson et al. (1984), can be represented as 
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y = Xfi + v if Za+u >0 and X(3 + v>0 
(3.16) 0 otherwise 
where y is the share of food expenditure away from home. The error terms u and v are 
independent and are distributed as w-N(0,o^) and v~N(0,l). 
The error terms v and u are assumed to be distributed as bivariate normal, 
The double-hurdle model specified above relies crucially on the assumption of bivariate 
normal errors as mentioned by Yen, Jensen and Wang (1996). To relax the assumption of 
nomality, Yen and Jensen (1995) applied the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation to 
the double-hurdle model. Based on their suggestion, we also apply the inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS) transformation to the dependent variable so that we can allow for nonnormal 
errors, 
where Sis an unknown parameter. With the transformation, the error term has a better chance 
of satisfying the normality and homoscedasticity assumptions. The transformation is linear 
when 6 approaches zero and behaves logarithmically for large values of y for a wide range of 
values for 0; it is known to be well suited for handling extreme values (Burbidge et al., 
(3.17) 
y(0) = \og[0y + (0y2+1)05 ]0~l =sinh~1($O0~1 (3.18) 
1988). Let p = ——, based on the transformation, the likelihood function for the IHS double-
a 
hurdle model is 
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l — n 
j'=0 
l -Q(Za,^- ,p)  (T n{(i+s
2y2)™0-5 
_y>0 
1 , 
X—Ç 
a 
y{0)-Xp 
<D 
Za + p y{0)-xp
y  
(1  -p 2 ) 0 5  
(3.19) 
where <P(.) and $.) are the univariate standard normal distribution and density functions, 
respectively, and <&(.,.,p) is the bivariate standard normal distribution function with 
correlation p. 
Based on Arabmazar and Schmidt (1981), Yen and Jensen (1995) and others, to 
overcome the restriction of homoscedasticity, the standard deviation cris allowed to vary 
across observations and is specified as a function of exogenous variables n 
<r=exp (ny), (3.20) 
where yis a parameter vector. The parameters of the model are 
The IHS double-hurdle model can be estimated by maxmizing the logarithm of the 
likelihood function (3.14). Estimation of the model requires the specification of the 
participation, consumption, and heteroscedasticity equations. 
Based on Yen and Jensen (1996), the probability of a positive observation is 
P(y  > 0) = P(/v > -zc,v > -x f i )  = <D(za ,—,p)  
<T 
(3.21) 
The conditional mean ofy is 
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 1 
1 
a J 
a-O1)0-5 
(3.22) 
dy 
The unconditional mean of y follows the property that E(y)=E(y\y>0)P(y>0). 
The effects on probability explain the binary decision on consumption, i.e., to eat out or 
not. The effects on the conditional level explain what makes those eating out spend either 
more or less. The effects on the unconditional level provide an overall assessment of what 
contributes to consumption level by increasing either the probability or conditional level. The 
effects of explanatory variables can be evaluated at the mean of these variables. Although the 
IHS transformation and the heteroscedasticity specification in the IHS double-hurdle model 
complicate the expressions for the marginal effects of variables, the marginal effects of 
continuous variables can be obtained by differentiating the probability, conditional mean, and 
unconditional mean of consumption. Based on these marginal responses, the elasticities are 
straightforward. For discrete variables, the marginal effects can be computed as the finite 
changes in probability, conditional level, and unconditional level resulting from a change in 
value of these variables from zero to one. 
Due to the marginal effects from both FAFH participation and consumption equation, 
the coefficients y's, /?'s and ac's in basic demanding restrictions of adding-up, homogeneity, 
symmetry in Formula (3.10), and in price and income elasticities (Formula (3.11) and (3.12)) 
should use relative marginal effects instead of coefficients from the FAFH consumption 
equation. 
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Data and Variable Definitions 
Data used in this study are compiled directly from the 1999 CPS data. Since 1995, the 
CPS survey has included a module to collect information on food expenditures, and food 
security status of households. The data include demographic and income data on the 
households and allow the study of the relationship between food consumption behavior, 
household demographic variables and food security status. Households are classified into two 
categories: food secure and food insecure on the basis of the response to 18 questions related 
to food security. The CPS data did not provide food quantities and prices, but do provide 
food expenditure information. We include the CPI as representative of the price for food, 
FAFH and food at home. The source of price data was the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 
Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) for total food consumption, food away from home and food at 
home (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1999). The regional specification for the CPI includes 
consolidated MSA code. Because only the CPI for urban consumers is available, we add an 
indicator of whether the household is living in metro area to capture the shortcoming (the 
data set only provides metro or non-metro). The sample consists of 45,000 households in 
April 1999. Information on total food expenditure, food away from home and food at home is 
provided for the households during the past week. Demographic information includes 
household size and composition by age and gender, region, state, county, race, income class, 
population class of metropolitan statistical area, and education and marriage status of 
reference person. 
Income information is reported categorically, rather than by specific level. It includes 
money from jobs, net income from business, farm or rent, pensions, dividends, interest, 
social security payments, social assistance cash payments (such as TANF) and any other 
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money income received by members of this family. Households were categorized into 
fourteen income ranges. In order to choose the sample of interest, it was necessary to convert 
the categorical income variable to a continuous measure. Because 8.04% of households did 
not provide income information, we first imputed categories for those households five times 
using Rubin's methods (1987).' After imputation of the categories, we used the range 
midpoints as representative of household income. 
As suggested by Andrews, Nord and Kabbani (2001), we chose households with income 
less than four times the poverty line as our sample for analysis. The poverty line for each 
household in the sample was estimated based on the number of adults and number of children 
in the household, and the age of the household reference person (older or younger than 65). 
The relevant poverty line comes from the Census Bureau. Excluding the highest-income 
extreme values. The total sample in the analysis is 30,280 households, of these households, 
10.9% were food insecure. In the sample, households can be distributed in the following 
income groups: income less than 100% of poverty income (29.6%); between 100% and 130% 
of poverty income (10.2%); between 130% and 185% of poverty income (10.3%); and 
between 185% and 400% of poverty income (49.8%). 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the share of food expenditure away from home 
in the total food expenditure, which is calculated from the data. FAFH expenditures include 
'income categories are assumed to relate with age, square of age, gender, race, Hispanic, 
marriage status and education attainment of households, household size, metro or nonmetro, 
living regions such as midwest, northeast, west and south. We impute the income five times 
and the results presented in the paper is the average results calculated based on the formula 
provided by Rubin (Rubin , 1987; Pan, Jensen and Fuller, 2000). 
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for meals or snacks where food preparation is performed by a commercial food facility. 
Examples of commercial food facilities are restaurants, fast food places, cafeterias, and 
vending machines. A food expenditure comparison between food secure households and food 
insecure households is presented in Table 3.1. The mean of weekly total food expenditure per 
person in the sample is $42.30; FAFH accounts for 25% of households and food insecure 
households is presented in Table 3.1. The mean of weekly total food expenditure per person 
in the sample is $42.30; FAFH accounts for 25% of food expenditures. Nearly 70% of the 
households in the sample ate out sometime during the survey week. The mean of total food 
expenditure per person for food secure households was $43.23, these households spent 25% 
of their food dollar on FAFH and had a 71.1% participation rate for FAFH spending. 
Households experiencing food insecurity spent on average $35.04 for total food; they spent 
18% of their food expenditures on FAFH and 55.5% had FAFH expenditures. Based on 
Table 3.1, food insecure households have relatively lower income, lower food expenditure, 
lower FAFH participation rates than those of households with food security. Although many 
households participating in the FSP suffer food insecurity, those participating in the FSP had 
lower income, less food expenditure per person, less FAFH expenditure and lower FAFH 
participation rates; they had more food at home and total food expenditure than was the rate 
for the food insecure households. 
To estimate the food expenditure equation and FAFH expenditure equations, we include 
explanatory variables such as CPI for food, food away from home and food at home; number 
of children age less than 6, between 6 and 13, and male and female children older than 13, 
male and female adults age between 19 and 64, and older than 64; the ratio of food 
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expenditure with Stone's price index; age of household; an indicator of household education; 
Hispanic; food stamp receipt; metro or non-metro; and northeast, midwest, south, or west. 
The definitions of dependent and independent variables and the corresponding sample 
statistics are reported in Table 3.2. We also include the mean of different variables based on 
the two subsamples (food secure and food insecure households). 
As discussed earlier, of particular interest is the sample mean of eating out and share of 
food expenditure away from home. The data show that over half of households with food 
insecurity eat out (55.5%) and 17% of food expenditure for food insecure households were 
for FAFH. As expected, a comparison to food secure households, they are less likely to eat 
out and spend less when they eat out. On average, households with food insecurity have more 
children, fewer working family members (both male and female), more family adults without 
jobs, and fewer older family members than those who are food secure. At the same time, the 
sample means show that the heads of the households with food insecurity are more likely to 
live in the South and West, have less education, are more likely to be non-white, Hispanic, 
single parents, and to participate in the food stamp program than those who are food secure. 
Empirical Findings 
Food Expenditure 
Table 3.3 presents the estimated weighted least squares (WLS) results of total food 
expenditure and associated standard errors. All of variables are significant in the equation of 
food secure households except the price index; however, only family structure, an indicator 
of living in a metro area, and income variables are significant at the 10% level for the food 
insecure equation. The Food Consumer Price Index (FCPI) is not significant in any of the 
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equations. One of the interesting results is that FSP participation indicator is significant and 
positive in food secure equation but not significant in food insecure equation. 
Given the other factors, food secure households who are Hispanic spend $3.12 less than 
those who are not Hispanic. A food secure household whose head has a high school degree 
and is married spends about $7.54 more than those whose head does not have a high school 
degree and is not married. The results also show food secure white households spend $4.97 
more than the non-whites. Among the four regions, food secure households living in west 
spend more on food than those living in northeast, south or midwest; they also spend $12.03 
more for those living in metro area than those who live in non-metro area. However, most of 
these variables in food insecure equation are not statistically significant. Only significant 
variables are indicators for living in metro and west area. The results indicate that those 
living in metro area spend $4.70 more than those living in non metro area; and those who live 
in west spend $6.38 more than those who live in Midwest area. The results may be related 
with the family size, living style, and price differences. 
Based on the results, one male-child between 14 and 18 increases food expenditure 
$25.39 and $21.24 per week for food secure and food insecure households, respectively. One 
female-child between 14 and 18 increases food expenditure $18.89 and $22.07 for food 
secure and food insecure households, respectively. Children between 14 and 18 have the 
largest marginal effects on food expenditure among family structure variables, especially for 
the food insecure households. One working male-adult also increases household food 
expenditure $19.17 and $15.49 for food secure and food insecure households, respectively. 
The marginal effect of working female adults is $8.26 and $9.31 for food secure and food 
insecure households, respectively. The major difference of marginal effects between food 
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secure households and food insecure households lies on non-working adults. One non-
working male adult increases food expenditure $12.80 and one non-working female adult 
increases food expenditure $8.19 for food secure households. However, there are no 
statistically significant marginal effects of non-working adults members for food insecure 
households. The results indicate that food insecure households are very difficult to increase 
food expenditure even if they have more adults. It also implies that food insecure households 
face more resources constraints than food secure households. 
To further measure the effects of different family structure and income on food 
consumption, we present the elasticities of food consumption with respect to age of reference 
person, food price and total income in Table 3.4. With a significant and positive effect on the 
level of food expenditure, the age variable suggests that food secure households with older 
head spend more on food than do other average age groups. The effect is negative but 
insignificant in the food insecure households. The effects of income are similar, and positive 
for all households. The income elasticity is 0.16 for food secure households and 0.15 for food 
insecure households. The results imply that a ten percent increase in income increases food 
consumption 1.61 percent for food secure households and 1.46 percent for food insecure 
households. The CPIs for food and nonfood are not statistically significant in any of the 
estimation. 
Food Away from Home 
The IHS double-hurdle model was estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the 
likelihood function (Eq3.14). Estimation of the model requires the specification of the 
participation, consumption, and heteroscedasticity equations. Excluding some variables from 
the equations is important in an estimation of the double-hurdle model due to the linear 
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combination Za-(p/o)Xp (Jones,1992; Yen, Jensen and Wang, 1996). As done by Yen, 
Jensen and Wang (1996), we excluded some insignificant variables from the participation 
equation based on preliminary analysis. At the same time, we did not include the logarithm 
of the ratio of food expenditure with the stone price index and price variables in the 
participation equation to simplify the calculation of elasticities, though the logarithm of the 
ratio is statistically significant in the equation. To test whether there exists heteroscedasticity, 
we used Goldfeld-Quandt's test (Green, 1997, pp. 551-552). Based on this test, the samples 
for the food secure and the total sample groups are indeed heteroscedastic, and 
heteroscedastic is related with household size. However, the food insecure sample is actually 
homoscedastic. Based on these preliminary checks, we include a heteroscedasticity equation 
in the full sample estimation and the food secure household estimation but not in the 
estimation for food insecure households. 
Results of the MLE based on the total sample, food secure sample and food insecure 
sample are presented in Table 3.5,3.6 and 3.7. The most notable modeling results are: the 
IHS parameter (ff) in the food secure and full sample equations are both significant at the 
0.10 levels. At the same time, one should notice that the parameters of heteroscedasticity of 
equations (in both the food secure sample and the whole sample) are statistically significant. 
The significance of these variables in the two equations leads to rejection of the 
homoscedasticity assumption. The results suggest that the error variance increases with 
household size (including number of children at different age groups, number of adults and 
older family members). Although the correlation (p) is significant in both the food security 
equa t ion  and  the  food  insecur i ty  equa t ion ,  the  s igns  a re  d i f fe ren t .  The  pos i t ive  cor re la t ion  (p)  
in the food security equation means that the random disturbances in FAFH consumption and 
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participation are affected in the same direction by random shocks or unmeasured effects; 
while the negative correlation in the food insecure equation means that the random 
disturbance in the two equations are affected in a different direction. 
For the food secure case, most variables seem to affect participation and consumption in 
the same direction. Education and marriage status of reference persons, region, race, food 
stamp program participation have the same sign in both equations. The results imply that 
household with a head with high school degree and who are married, who are white are more 
likely to eat out and spend more if they eat out. The negative signs on food stamp program 
participation imply that households participating in the FSP are less likely to eat out and 
spend less if they eat out. Households with children (either male or female) between 6 and 18 
are more likely to eat out, and conditional on participation, to spend more than those at home. 
Number of working family members (either female and male) increases the probability of 
eating out and also has larger share of food expenditure away from home. Number of male 
jobless adults in the family decreases the likelihood of eating out, however households with 
more male jobless adults have larger share of food expenditure away from home conditional 
on eating out. Younger children in the family have different effects on participation and 
consumption equation: the number of children under 6 is positive and significant in the 
consumption equation, and not statistically significant -though negative- in the participation 
equation. Price is not significant in the estimation. Number of older female family members 
is not a significant variable in the participation equation. However, it is significant and 
positive in the consumption equation. 
In the food insecure equation, families with children older than 6 are also more likely to 
eat out and spend relatively more away from home than others. Families with more working 
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adults (either male or female) are more likely to eat out and spend larger share of their food 
expenditure on FAFH than families with fewer working adults. Number of children under 
age 6, number of female nonworking adults, number of older family members (either female 
or male) are not significant variables in the participation equation but all of the estimated 
coefficient are significant and positive in the consumption equation. The effects of reference 
person with a high school degree, being white and single, not being Hispanic are associated 
with the probability of households eating out. At the same time, households participating in 
the food stamp program are less likely to eat out and spend less on FAFH than those who do 
not participate in the FSP. 
Comparing the results of food secure households with those of food insecure 
households, the number of working adults (male and female), number of male non-working 
adults, number of children age between 6 and 18, are the family structure variables which are 
significant and have the same sign on both food secure and food insecure cases. Other 
variables that have the same sign and are statistically significant in the two cases are the 
indicator variables of the reference person being Hispanic, living in metro area, and 
participating in FSP. The coefficient estimate for the food stamp program participation 
dummy indicates that participants are less likely to eat away from home than nonparticipants, 
which is consistent with most literatures (e.g. Lee and Brown, 1986). 
The sign of the race variable in the participation equation indicates that white 
households are more likely to eat out than others. Although an indicator of the reference 
person marital status is statistically significant in the two equations for both food insecure 
and food secure households, the sign is not the same. The reason that food secure households 
and married reference persons are more likely to eat out than those households with only a 
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single head may be because single heads with dependents are more closely tied to home. The 
negative sign of marriage status variable in the food insecure group implies that for this 
group, households with both male and female heads tend to spend less away from home than 
those with only single adult head. This result may be due to better planning for two-head 
households and different lifestyles in the food insecure households. Number of older children 
(including the number of children age between 6 and 13, and older than 13) positively affects 
the participation and the share of food expenditure away from home in both food secure and 
food insecure cases. 
Elasticities 
Table 3.8 presents the elasticities of probability with respect to different variables 
evaluated at the sample means. The elasticities indicate that doubling (a 100 percent increase) 
in the number of working female adults and working male adults for food insecure 
households increases the probability of eating out by about 13.7% and 11.6%, respectively. 
For food secure households, the numbers are similar: 7.4% for working males and 7.9% for 
working females. The results also show that these two age categories have the largest effects 
on the probability of eating out among the different family member age groups for both food 
insecure and food secure households. Also, the results imply that increasing the number of 
working adults in the family has a greater effect for food insecure households than for food 
secure households. One of the reasons may be that, as incomes (both wages and salaries) 
increase, the opportunity cost of time increases. The rising value of time has driven 
households away from home-cooked meals and to greater demand for convenience. With a 
significant and negative effect on the probability of eating out, the age variable suggests that 
older household-heads are less likely to consume FAFH than do other average age groups. 
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Table 3.8 also shows that a ten percent increases in food expenditure increases the 
probability of eating out by 9.14 percent for food secure households and 7.85 percent for 
food insecure households. The elasticities of CPI for FAFH and food at home are not 
statistically significant here, although we do have negative sign for CPI of FAFH and 
positive sign for CPI of food at home, as expected. The lack of significance in the price 
variables may indicate that the CPIs are not good price representatives for the household 
consumption in the sample. 
For the discrete explanatory variables, we calculate the average effects of these 
variables on the probability of eating out (Table 3.9). In particular, the effects of each 
variable were calculated as the finite changes in these components of consumption as the 
value of the variable changes from zero to one, ceteris paribus. These results suggest that, for 
households with food insecurity, relative to other households in the group, household-heads 
with a high school degree, living in metro areas, and being white are 12.5 percent, 4.3 
percent, and 6.2 percent respectively, more likely to consume food away from home than 
others; households participating in the FSP are 9.1 percent less likely and those who are 
Hispanic are 21 percent less likely to eat out than others. For food secure households, those 
participating in the FSP are 14.4% less likely to eat out than those not participating in the 
FSP. The effects of other variables can be interpreted in the same manner. Among all the 
discrete variables, being Hispanic, participating in the FSP, living in northeast have the 
largest different effects on eating out. One interesting results here is that food secure 
households with married heads in food secure sample are 3.1 percent more likely to eat out 
than the households with single head. However, food insecure households with married heads 
are 5.1% less likely to eat out than those with single reference person. 
86 
Table 3.10 provides the elasticities of the conditional level with respect to continuous 
variables also evaluated at the sample means. Based on the Table, both the number of 
working female and number of working male adults have the largest elasticities among all the 
family structure variables. For the whole sample, doubling the number of male adults and 
number of female adults increases FAFH consumption by 31.6% and 20.2%, respectively. 
For food secure households, doubling the number of adults leads to increase in FAFH 
expenditure 32.9% for males and 20.0% for females. The elasticities for food insecure 
households are quite a bit smaller and similar in size: 8.5% for males and 8.9% for females. 
One interesting result here is that the FAFH expenditure elasticity with respect to the level of 
food expenditure for food insecure households is larger than that of food secure households. 
The result implies that when food insecure households do eat out, they are relatively more 
response to changes in total food expenditures in spending on FAFH than are food secure 
households. 
Table 3.11 provides the elasticities of unconditional mean evaluated at the sample 
means of all variables. The individual effects of working male and female are similar for 
food insecure households. However there exist significant differences for food secure 
households: the elasticity for working male adults is larger than that for working female 
adults. Similarly, the effects of other variables for food secure households are greater than 
those of food insecure households. The elasticities of unconditional mean of food 
expenditure shows that FAFH is luxury good (with elasticity greater than unity) compared to 
food at home (with point elasticity estimation 0.63,0.59 and 0.58 for whole sample, food 
secure sample and food insecure sample, respectively). The overall effect of food expenditure 
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is driven by both the positive effect on the probability of consumption and also the positive 
effect on the conditional level of consumption. 
To calculate the income elasticity of FAFH, we need to Combine the élasticités of 
uncomditional FAFH expenditure in Table 3.11 with income elasticities of food expenditure 
in Table 3.4, the point estimate of total income elasticities on FAFH is 0.22,0.22 and 0.21 
for whole sample, food secure and food insecure households, respectively. The results for the 
food secure and the food insecure groups are similar, with the relatively larger elasticity for 
the food secure group. The sign and magnitude of the income elasticities shows that FAFH is 
normal and a necessity good for both food secure and food insecure households. 
Summary 
In this paper we use an IHS double-hurdle model to estimate the consumer demand 
systems with zero expenditures. The study estimated the effects of family structure and 
demographic variables on food away from home consumption based on different food 
security status. The results suggest that interaction between the participation and 
consumption decisions is important in modeling consumption of food away from home and 
that the specification of a more flexible error distribution is justified. The double-hurdle 
estimation shows that family structure and demographic variables play significant roles in the 
decisions about whether to eat out and how much to spend. Being food insecure limits the 
consumers' participation and consumption decisions. One interesting result is that FAFH is a 
normal and necessary good for both food secure and food insecure households, though the 
income elasticity for food insecure households is lower than that of food secure households. 
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One of the purposes of this paper was to compare the characteristics and food spending 
behavior of households classified by food security status. Findings indicate that some 
difference exist between the two groups. Weighted least squares estimate of food expenditure 
shows that food secure households who are white, live in metro areas, are married, and 
participate in the FSP spend more than other food secure households. However, only location 
variables (such as indicator of living in metro area and west region) make the food 
expenditure different for food insecure households. The marginal effects of family structure 
variables based on different age-sex-work status on food expenditure are larger for food 
secure households than those of food insecure households. Households with food insecurity 
are less likely to eat out and spend relatively less away from home even if they eat out. 
Our results also indicate other important distinguishing features for food away from 
home expenditure between the different food security levels: first, working status (measured 
by number of working male and female adults) has a greater effect on expenditures of food 
secure households than for those of food insecure households; second, although the total 
income elasticity of FAFH is almost the same between food secure and food insecure groups, 
the FAFH expenditure elasticity is different: the elasticity of food insecure households has a 
relatively larger value than food secure households. The difference may relate with the 
lifestyle, family structure, etc.; third, households participating in the FSP have the significant 
larger food expenditure than those who are not in the program for food secure sample; 
however, the difference is not statistically significant in the food insecure sample. At the 
same time, the results of this study agree fairly closely with the earlier findings about the 
effects of food stamp program participation. The households participating in the program are 
less likely to eat out and spend less away from home even if they eat out. 
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The results in the paper also show that food spending behaviors could be captured in 
demand analysis with demographic factors, such as region, age, family structure, and food 
security status. 
The study provides important implications to the government and FAFH industry. The 
results highlights West and Midwest are more likely to eat out than other regions. At the 
same time, food secure households with married heads are more likely to eat and food 
insecure households are less likely to eat out than households with single parents. Nonwhites, 
Hispanic and household heads without a high school degree and living in nonmetro areas 
continue to less likely to eat out than other households. The industry may make use of the 
opportunities. 
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Table 3.1 A comparison between food secure and food insecure households, Food Stamp 
Program receipts (Mean and standard error in parentheses) 
Food secure Food insecure 
Total households households FSP receipts 
N 30.280 26,978 3,302 2,059 
Weekly total income per household 
(Income) 537.409 562.815 341.540"* 205.094"* 
(2.410) (2.496) (4.829) (4.086) 
Weekly total food expenditure per 
household (EXP) 98.419 99.999 86.054*" 89.762 
(0.463) (0.498) (1.214) (1.953) 
Food expenditure per person 42.301 43.229 35.042*" 31.276*** 
(0.205) (0.220) (0.540) (0.615) 
Food at home(FAH): 
Average FAH expenditure 73.830 74.189 71.015"* 79.973*** 
(0.375) (0.401) (1.062) (1.855) 
Average FAH expenditure per person 30.883 31.194 28.452*** 27.915 
(0.150) (0.159) (0.452) (0.591) 
Average FAH expenditure for those 
with FAH 77.298 77.690 74.238*** 82.705*** 
(0.377) (0.403) (1.066) (1.878) 
% with FAH 95.513 95.494 95.659 96.697* 
(0.137) (0.145) (0.400) (0.449) 
Food away from home (FAFH): 
Average FAFH expenditure 24.589 25.810 15.038*** 9.789*** 
(0.226) (0.247) (0.458) (0.523) 
Average FAFH expenditure per 
person 11.418 12.035 6.591*** 3.362*** 
(0.124) (0.136) (0.237) (1-172) 
Average FAFH expenditure for those 
with FAFH 35.459 36.295 27.082*** 21.197*** 
(0.289) (0.309) (0.674) (0.988) 
% with FAFH 69.345 71.112 55.528*** 46.179"* 
(0.295) (0.307) (0.958) (1.221) 
Note: '"difference between food secure and food insecure households, and between food insecure households 
and FSP receipts significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3.2 Variable definitions and sample statistics (weighted mean and standard error in 
parenthesis) 
Food Secure Food Insecure 
Variables Definition Full Sample households households 
S-FAFH Share of expenditure for FAFH 0.250 0.258 0.175*" 
(1.666e-3) (1.767e-3) (4.869e-3) 
S-FAH Share of expenditure at home 0.750 0.742 0.825*** 
(1.666e-3) (1.767e-3) (4.869e-3) 
FCPI Price index for food 165.671 165.673 165.657 
(0.072) (0.077) (0.211) 
ACPI Price index for FAFH 169.358 169.367 169.289 
(0.083) (0.088) (0.244) 
HCPI Prince index at home 160.781 160.773 160.844 
(0.077) (0.0812) (0.230) 
EXPP Weekly food expenditure per person 42.301 43.229 35.042*** 
(0.205) (0.220) (0.540) 
Number of Children: 
Under 6 Number of children under age 6 0.257 0.240 0.387*** 
(3.889e-03) (3.986e-03) (0.014) 
6-13 Number of children less than 14 0.374 0.353 0.544*** 
And older than 5 (4.861 e-03) (5.034e-03) (0.017) 
14-18 Number of children between 14 0.203 0.193 0.274*** 
And 18 (3.288e-03) (3.423e-03) (0.274) 
M 14-18 Number of male children older 0.104 0.098 0.147*** 
Than 13 (2.231 e-03) (2.311 e-03) (0.147) 
F 14-18 Number of female children older 0.099 0.095 0.127*** 
Than 13 (2.142e-03) (2.237e-03) (7.099e-03) 
Number of working-age adults: 
M-W19-64 Number of male and working 0.566 0.580 0.460*** 
Adults (3.866e-03) (4.084e-03) (0.012) !
 
1 Number of male and not working 0.025 0.021 0.050*** 
Adults (1.0456-03) (1.022e-03) (4.560e-03) 
F-w 19-64 Number of female and working 0.521 0.527 0.478*** 
Adults (3.689e-03) (3.922e-03) (0.011) 
F-nw 19-64 Number of female and not 0.023 0.020 0.054*** 
Working adults (1.005e-03)(0.974e-03) (4.480e-03) 
Number of the older adults: 
M-older Number of male older than 64 0.415 0.442 0.208*** 
(4.374e-03) (4.760e-03) (9.288e-03) 
F-older Number of female older than 64 0.417 0.444 0.209*** 
(4.413e-03) (4.802e-03) (9.394e-03) 
Age Age of reference persons 48.054 48.785 42.333*** 
(0.115) (0.123) (0.290) 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Food Secure Food Insecure 
Variables Definition Full Sample households households 
Dummy variables: yes=1, no=0 
Eat out Household eats out in 0.693 0.711 0.555"* 
the past week (2.949e-03) (3.072e-03) (9.579e-03) 
West Household resides in 0.214 0.208 0.258"* 
the West (2.668e-03) (2.803e-03) (8.508e-03) 
Northeast Household resides in 0.180 0.182 0.160"* 
the Northeast (2.303e-03) (2.456e-03) (6.606e-03) 
South Household resides in 0.365 0.362 0.389*** 
the South (3.144e-03) (3.329e-03) (9.549e-03) 
Metro Household resides in 0.776 0.773 0.798"* 
the metro area (2.633e-03) (2.809e-03) (7.520e-03) 
White Reference person is 0.834 0.850 0.711*** 
White (2.490e-03) (2.543e-03) (8.950e-03) 
Reference person has 
Education a 0.462 0.477 0.341*" 
high school degree (3.206e-03) (3.406e-03) (9.201 e-03) 
Hispanic Reference person is 0.106 0.095 0.19*** 
Hispanic (2.083e-03) (2.123e-03) (7.112e-03) 
Married Reference person is 0.522 0.542 0.362*** 
Married (3.214e-03) (3.400e-03) (9.274e-03) 
FSP Participation Household is a food- 0.071 0.046 0.269"* 
stamp receipt (1.674e-03) (1.462e-03) (8.500e-03) 
N 30280 26978 3302 
Note: "'difference between food security and food insecurity is significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3.3 Weighted Least Square results of food expenditure equation (Independent 
variable: household food expenditure) 
Food Secure Food Insecure 
Total Sample Households Households 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Constant 26.225" 10.945 20.039" 11.815 66.031" 27.943 
Education 7.334*** 0.771 7.544*** 0.822 2.291 2.157 
Metro 10.791*" 0.788 11.601*** 0.833 4.696* 2.437 
Northeast 7.128*** 1.071 7.407"* 1.178 3.485 3.245 
West 11.172*** 1.109 12.030*** 1.189 6.378" 3.005 
South 3.254*** 0.928 3.677*** 0.985 -0.369 2.730 
White 4.704*** 1.109 4.974*** 1.247 0.666 2.437 
Hispanic -4.140*** 1.454 -3.121* 1.654 -2.298 3.000 
Married 8.362"* 0.938 8.847*** 1.006 1.390 2.684 
FSP Participation 1.482 1.585 4.542" 2.178 2.171 2.380 
Age 0.476*** 0.117 0.573*** 0.126 -0.224 0.338 
Age square -0.836e-2*** 0.109e-2 -0.959e-2*" 0.117e-2 -0.204e-2 0.354e-2 
Number of children: 
Under 6 8.422*** 0.852 9.259*** 0.960 5.037*** 1.739 
Age 6-13 16.082*** 0.678 16.579*** 0.754 14.631*** 1.566 
Mage 14-18 24.407*** 1.404 25.386*" 1.544 21.239*** 3.279 
F Age 14-18 19.169*** 1.438 18.893*" 1.580 22.067*** 3.378 
Number of the older adults: 
M-older 6.907"* 2.406 7.287"* 2.537 2.386 7.910 
F-older 4.981" 2.357 4.677"* 2.483 5.831 7.916 
Number of working-age adults: 
M-w 19-64 18.803*** 0.923 19.171*** 1.009 15.487*** 2.197 
M-nw 19-64 10.165*** 2.228 12.800*" 2.620 3.415 4.002 
F-w 19-64 8.456*** 0.832 8.256*** 0.899 9.306*** 2.235 
F-nw 19-64 7.083*** 2.603 8.190"* 3.129 5.667 4.537 
Food CPI 0.217e-2 0.102 -0.046 0.109 0.216 0.289 
Non-Food CPI -0.235 0.182 0.062 0.196 -0.390 0.502 
Income 0.030*** 0.143e-2 0.028*** 0.149e-2 0.037*" 0.552e-2 
Adjusted R-square 0.256 0.258 0.242 
N 30,280 26,978 3,302 
Note: '"significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.4 Elasticities of food expenditure for some of the continuous variables in the 
food expenditure equation 
Total Food Secure households Food insecure households 
Point estimate Std Error Point estimate Std Error Point estimate Std Error 
Age 0.228*** 0.059 0.275*** 0.064 -0.109 0.172 
Non food CPI -0.032 0.249 0.083 0.264 -0.611 0.787 
Food CPI 0.368e-2 0.173 -0.077 0.182 0.417 0.558 
Income 0.167*** 7.888e-3 0.161*** 0.847e-2 0.146*** 0.021 
Note: •••significant at 1% level; **at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.5 Maximum likelihood estimation of the IMS double hurdle model for FAFH 
(Whole Sample) 
Participation Consumption 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Heteroskedasticitv 
Coefficient Std Error 
Constant 0.056* 0.035 0.244"* 0.012 -1.971"* ' 0.029 
Education 0.367"* 0.017 0.022*** 2.605e-3 
Metro 0.092"* 0.018 0.019"* 2.643e-3 
Northeast -0.384"* 0.024 -0.014"** 3.691 e-3 
West -0.152"* 0.024 -0.010"* 3.212e-3 
South -0.113"* 0.022 4.845e-3* 2.887e-3 
White 0.328"* 0.023 8.947e-3" 3.680e-3 
Hispanic -0.448"* 0.029 -0.011" 4.680e-3 
Married 0.074*" 0.019 0.041"* 3.080e-3 
FSP Participation -0.435*" 0.032 -0.059"* 6.908e-3 
Age -2.111e-3*** 4.363e-4 
Age Square 6.41 e-6 4.539e-6 
Number of children: 
Under 6 -0.013 0.015 0.028"* 2.472e-3 0.033*** 8.973e-3 
Age 6-13 0.059*** 0.012 0.040*** 2.181e-3 0.018"* 7.348e-3 
Age 14-18: 0.019" 0.010 
M age 14-18 0.076*** 0.025 0.051"* 3.743e-3 
F age 14-18 0.066"* 0.026 0.056*** 3.894e-3 
Number of the older adults: 0.060*** 8.676e-3 
M-older -0.145" 0.059 0.024*** 9.238e-3 
F-older -0.059 0.059 0.023"* 9.040e-3 
Number of working-age adults: 0.090*** 0.019 
M-w 19-64 0.163*** 0.017 0.065*** 3.357e-3 
M-nw 19-64 -0.145*** 0.049 0.032"* 7.506e-3 
F-w 19-64 0.247*** 0.017 0.043*** 2.767e-3 
F-nw 19-64 0.020 0.054 0.018*** 8.614e-3 
Log(ACPI-HCPI) -0.024 0.021 
Log(EXP/Stone's 
price Index) -0.071*** 3.003e-3 
P 0.232*** 0.032 
9 3.605*** 0.147 
N 
Log-likelihood 
30,280 
-470655.00 
Note: '"significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.6 Maximum likelihood estimation of the IMS double-hurdle model for FAFH (food 
secure sample) 
Particioation Consumption Heteroskedasticitv 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Constant 0.081** 0.038 0.245*** 0.022 -1.937*** 0.046 
Education 0.366*** 0.018 0.024*** 5.646e-3 
Metro 0.099*** 0.019 0.019*** 3.271 e-3 
Northeast -0.389*** 0.025 -0.017*** 6.564e-3 
West -0.151*** 0.025 -0.012*** 4.015e-3 
South -0.094*** 0.023 5.765e-03* 3.471e-3 
White 0.337*** 0.025 9.539e-03* 5.868e-3 
Hispanic -0.394*** 0.032 -9.953E-03 7.63ÔB-3 
Married 0.088*** 0.020 0.045*** 3.559e-3 
FSP Participation -0.406*** 0.042 -0.064*** 0.010 
Age -0.183e-2***4.598e-4 
Age Square 2.667E-06 4.83174e-6 
Number of children: 
Under 6 -0.021 0.016 0.030*** 2.758e-3 0.034*** 9.426e-3 
Age 6-13 0.058*** 0.013 0.044*** 2.603e-3 0.015*** 6.761 e-3 
Age 14-18: 0.029*** 0.010 
Mage 14-18 0.075*** 0.027 0.056*** 4.262e-3 
F age 14-18 0.046*** 0.027 0.061*** 4.419e-3 
Number of the older adults: 0.071*** 8.640e-2 
M-older -0.146*** 0.058 0.029*** 9.481 e-3 
F-older -0.070 0.058 0.021** 9.096e-3 
Number of the working-age adults: 0.114*** 0.020 
M-w 19-64 0.143*** 0.017 0.069*** 3.940e-3 
M-nw 19-64 -0.098* 0.055 0.035*** 0.010 
F-w 19-64 0.231*** 0.017 0.044*** 4.089e-3 
F-nw 19-64 0.107* 0.062 0.015*** 9.194e-3 
Log(ACPI-HCPI) -0.022 0.023 
Log(EXP/Stone's 
price Index) -0.070*** 3.010e-3 
P 0.273* 0.162 
6 3.358*** 0.141 
N 26,978 
Log-likelihood 25661.50 
Note: '"significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.7 Maximum likelihood estimation of the IMS double-hurdle model for FAFH 
(food insecure sample) 
Participation Consumption 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Constant 0.030 0.095 0.240*** 0.029 
Education 0.276*" 0.051 -1.091e-02 5.275e-3 
Metro 0.231*** 0.055 0.015"* 5.552e-3 
Northeast -0.336*** 0.077 0.010 8.007e-3 
West -0.102 0.070 2.471 E-03 6.109e-3 
South -0.214*** 0.067 4.18E-03 6.137e-3 
White 0.155*** 0.057 -3.81 E-03 5.515e-3 
Hispanic -0.534*** 0.068 0.0121 9.112e-3 
Married -0.128** 0.057 0.010* 5.617e-3 
FSP Participation -0.315*** 0.056 -0.016" 7.486e-3 
Age -3.472e-02*" 1.005e-3 
Age Square 2.926e-05*** 1.110e-5 
Number of Children: 
Under 6 0.053 0.035 0.011"* 3.678e-3 
Age 6-13 0.081*** 0.027 0.015"* 3.758e-3 
Age 14-18: 
M age 14-18 0.115** 0.058 0.020*** 6.290e-3 
F age 14-18 0.169*** 0.065 0.018"* 6.290e-3 
Number of the older adults: 
M-older -0.277 0.184 -9.845E-03 0.016 
F-older -0.133 0.181 0.031*** 0.016 
Number of working-age adults: 
M-w 19-64 0.266*** 0.043 0.027*** 7.019e-3 
M-nw 19-64 -0.232** 0.105 0.021* 0.012 
F-w 19-64 0.322*** 0.043 0.025*** 7.276e-3 
f-nw 19-64 -0.120 0.097 0.031* 0.012 
Log(ACPI-HCPI) -5.778E-02 0.039 
Log(EXP/Stone's price Index) -0.060"* 0.011 
Std Deviation 0.088*** 0.015 
P -0.381* 0.214 
e 7.569*** 1.389 
N 3,302 
Log-likelihood -3007.98 
Note: "'significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.8 Elasticities of probability for FAFH with respect to continuous variables 
Whole Sample 
Point estimate Std Error 
Food Secure households Food Insecure households 
Point estimate Std Error Point estimate Std Error 
Number of Children: 
Under 6 0.637e-2 0.018 
Age 6-13 0.027*** 0.227e-2 
M age 14-18 0.010*** 0.123e-2 
F age 14-18 0.010*** 0.122e-2 
Number of the older adults: 
M-older -0.011** O.ôOOe-2 
Folder 0.336e-2 0.011 
Number of working-age adults: 
M-w 19-64 0.085*** 0.469e-2 
M-nw 19-64 -0.354e-3 0.574e-3 
F-w 19-64 0.082*** 0.381 e-2 
F-nw 19-64 0.716e-3 0.525e-3 
0.514e-2 
0.025*** 
0.966e-2*** 
0.899e-2*** 
-0.933e-2** 
0.529e-3 
0.079*** 
0.124e-03 
0.074*** 
0.106e-2*** 
0.165 
0.208e-2 
0.113e-2 
0.113e-2 
0.027 
0.056*** 
0.022*** 
0.022*** 
0.491 e-2 -0.044 
0.011 0.569e-2 
0.456e-2 0.116*** 
O.ôOOe-3 -0.348e-2 
0.361 e-2 0.137*** 
0.449e-3 0.190e-2 
0.841 
0.010 
0.576e-2 
0.532e-2 
0.026 
0.025 
0.013 
0.366e-2 
0.013 
0.379e-2 
AGE 
HCPI 
ACPI 
EXP 
-0.097*** 
0.047 
-0.028 
0.904*** 
0.010 
0.029 
0.028 
0.774e-2 
-0.094*** 
0.040 
-0.023 
0.914*** 
0.935e-2 -0.148* 
0.029 
0.029 
0.043 
-0.900e-2 
0.679e-2 0.785* 
0.045 
0.112 
0.116 
0.057 
Note: "'significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.9 Marginal effects of probability for FAFH with respect to the discrete variables 
Whole Samole Food Secure Households Food Insecure Households 
Point Point Point 
estimate Std Error estimate Std Error estimate Std Error 
Education 0.118*** 0.530e-02 0.114*** 0.548e-02 0.125*** 0.021 
Metro 0.061*** 0.659e-02 0.066*** 0.686e-02 0.043** 0.022 
Northeast -0.138*** 0.896e-02 -0.137*** 0.310e-02 -0.134*** 0.030 
West -0.053*** 0.840e-02 -0.052*** 0.878e-02 -0.040 0.028 
South -0.039*** 0.767e-02 -0.031*** 0.793e-02 -0.085*** 0.027 
White 0.118*** 0.842e-02 0.119*** 0.918e-02 0.062*** 0.023 
Hispanic -0.165*** 0.011 -0.142*** 0.012 -0.210*** 0.026 
Married 0.026*** 0.642e-02 0.031*** 0.669e-02 -0.051** 0.023 
FSP Participation -0.152*** 0.012 -0.144*** 0.016 -0.091*** 0.016 
Note: '"significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.10 Elasticities of conditional consumption for FAFH with respect to continuous 
variables 
Whole Sample Food Security Food Insecurity 
Variable Point estimate Std Error Point estimate Std Error Point estimate Std Error 
Number of Children: 
Under 6 
Age 6-13 
M age 14-18 
F age 14-18 
Number of the older adults: 
M-older 0.149*** 
F-older 0.141*** 
Number of working-age adults: 
0.066*** 
0.119*** 
0.043*** 
0.045*** 
M-w 19-64 
M-nw 19-64 
F-w 19-64 
F-nw 19-64 
0.316*** 
0.885e-2*** 
0.202*** 
0.513e-2*** 
0.562e-2 
0.695e-2 
0.327e-2 
0.326e-2 
0.030 
0.029 
0.013 
0.154e-2 
0.011 
0.131e-2 
0.063*** 
0.115*** 
0.043*** 
0.046*** 
0.182*** 
0.150*** 
0.329*** 
0.794e-2*** 
0.200*** 
0.378e-2*** 
0.541 e-2 
0.673e-2 
0.322e-2 
0.331 e-2 
0.033 
0.032 
0.013 
0.149e-2 
0.011 
0.121 e-2 
0.026*** 
0.053*** 
0.020*** 
0.017*** 
-0.020 
0.034* 
0.085*** 
0.455e-2 
0.089*** 
0.010*** 
0.010 
0.016 
0.648e-2 
0.598e-2 
0.020 
0.021 
0.023 
0.335e-2 
0.025 
0.406e-2 
Age 
HCPI 
ACPI 
EXP 
-0.549* 
0.265* 
-0.159 
0.460** 
0.042 
0.155 
0.156 
0.010 
-0.561*** 
0.234 
-0.134 
0.494*** 
0.045 
0.163 
0.164 
0.011 
-0.241*** 
0.088 
-0.019 
0.649*** 
0.075 
0.220 
0.224 
0.123 
Note: '"significant at 1% level; "at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
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Table 3.11 Elasticities of unconditional mean for FAFH with respect to continuous variables 
Variable 
Whole Sample 
Point estimate Std Error 
Food secure households Food insecure households 
Point estimate Std Error Point estimate Std Error 
Number of Children: 
Under 6 0.073*" 
Age 6-13 0.146*** 
M age 14-18 0.053*** 
F age 14-18 0.055*** 
Number of the older adults: 
M-older 0.163*** 
Folder 0.154*** 
Number of working-age adults: 
M-w 19-64 
M-nw 19-64 
F-w 19-64 
F-nw 19-64 
0.401*** 
0.847e-2*** 
0.284*** 
O.ôôôe-2*** 
7.452E-03 
9.229E-03 
4.504E-03 
4.488E-03 
3.473E-02 
3.401 E-02 
1.770E-02 
2.119E-03 
1.497E-02 
1.539E-03 
0.068*** 
0.140*** 
0.053*** 
0.055*** 
0.197*** 
0.161*** 
0.408*** 
0.804e-2*** 
0.274*** 
0.411 e-2*** 
7.218E-03 
8.999E-03 
4.459EO3 
4.550E-03 
3.808E-02 
3.723E-02 
1.843E-02 
2.031 E-03 
1.534E-02 
1.411 E-03 
0.054*** 
0.110*** 
0.042*** 
0.038*** 
-0.064 
0.040 
0.201*** 
0.107e-2 
0.226*** 
0.012*** 
1.871 E-02 
2.613E-02 
1.236E-02 
1.134E-02 
0.046 
0.047 
0.036 
0.701 E-02 
0.038 
0.785E-02 
Age -0.645*** 
HCPI 0.311 
ACPI -0.186 
EXP 1.366*** 
Note: "'significant at 1% level; 
0.052 
0.183 
0.184 
0.054 
-0.654*** 
0.273 
-0.121 
1.409— 
*at 5% level; * at 10% level. 
0.055 
0.192 
0.136 
0.084 
-0.389* 
0.141 
-0.389 
1.434" 
0.120 
0.360 
0.120 
0.174 
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4. FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRM PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
Although federal welfare reform legislation (the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act—PRWORA) was passed in August 1996,43 states 
experimented with welfare reform under waivers from Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp Program rules between 1993 and 1996. Iowa was one of 
these earliest welfare reform states. On October 1, 1993, Iowa implemented the Family 
Investment Program (FIP) and a slightly revised Food Stamp Program (FSP) in 90 of the 99 
counties in the state. In the remaining nine counties, both pre-reform and reform programs 
operated concurrently. Iowa joined Oregon as one of the first two states to launch major 
changes in its social assistance programs (Prindle et al., 1999). The goals of FIP were to help 
the recipients experience significant financial benefits from employment; to move toward 
self-sufficiency while discouraging behavior that increases dependence (that is, shift 
responsibility for the long-term well-being of low-income families from the state to the 
parents in those families); and to foster the formation and maintenance of two-parent families 
(Gordon and Martin, 1999). 
In 1995, Iowa launched a project to develop a linked administrative data system in order 
to evaluate the effects of FIP and other social assistance reforms. Because of greater 
attention to program participation and usage, there has been increased interest in the use of 
administrative data for social science research. Two recent evaluations note the strengths of 
administrative databases: the data are relatively inexpensive, and the databases are generally 
longitudinal and can be linked with other administrative data sets to create a comprehensive 
representation of program use and client outcomes (Hotz et al., 1998; UC DATA, 1999). 
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We used Iowa administrative data to analyze the relationship between FIP and 
employment. These data were linked for all FIP recipients in April 1993. The data set 
includes detailed information on child support collections, FIP participation, quarterly wage 
earnings, household variables, and demographic variables. Because the administrative 
records did not require reporting on education when the individuals applied for FIP, about 50 
percent of the observations are missing data on education. However, education is a major 
indicator of personal skills and hence the relationship between welfare reform and 
employment. Therefore, a major challenge of the study was to address the issue of 
nonresponse, or missing data. 
There are several ways to deal with the missing data problem. Little and Rubin (1987) 
discuss several traditional approaches for incomplete data analysis. These approaches include 
using only complete cases, using available cases, and imputing missing values. However, the 
first two methods result in a loss of statistical power because partially complete cases 
typically are discarded from the analysis. Rubin (1987) advocates the use of multiple 
imputations, the method used by Keng, Garasky, and Jensen (2000). We used an alternative 
approach—fractional imputation as described in Kim (2000)—to compensate for missing 
educational attainment. The approach is at least as powerful as Rubin's multiple imputation 
method (see Kim, 2000; and Pan, Fuller, and Jensen, 2001 for more details). 
Our study examined factors that affect the possibility of working and the potential wage 
for FIP recipients in order to better understand program and labor force participation for low-
income households, including differences in rural and non-rural location. The paper is 
organized as follows: First, we discuss the data and outline the distribution of the education 
variable available in the data set. Then, we describe briefly the procedure of fractional 
imputation and jackknife variance estimation. Next, we give the demographic characteristics 
of the reference persons, followed by a discussion of the estimation procedures and a 
presentation of the numerical results. The final section includes a brief conclusion. 
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Data 
The FIP data are structured as a two-year quarterly panel, beginning with October 1993, 
the start of the FIP program, and ending in September 1995 (Keng, Garasky, and Jensen, 
2000). Most data are from the linked administrative record data for cases active in April 
1993. Additional variables provide information on the economic and social conditions in the 
local geographic area. These variables include the poverty population as a fraction of the 
total population in the county, and the working age population (between ages 18 and 64) as a 
fraction of the total population, employment ratio, and its increase. The total number of 
observations used in the empirical analysis is 32,783. 
Iowa can be classified into 10 metropolitan counties (Beale codes 0-3), 9 urban 
nonmetro (large city urban) counties (Beale codes 4 and 5), 35 "rural" adjacent counties 
(adjacent to a metro area, rural and small-city urban counties, Beale codes 6 and 8), and 45 
"rural" nonadjacent counties (non-adjacent small-city urban and rural counties, Beale codes 7 
and 9) (Butler and Beale, 1994). Metropolitan counties are referred to as the "metro" area. 
The "urban" areas are urban nonmetro counties that have a city with at least 20,000 in 
population. The "rural" area includes small cities (less than 20,000 in population), rural 
adjacent counties, and rural non-adjacent counties. In some of the analysis, we combine the 
metro and urban areas and refer to them as "non-rural." 
The education variables presented a challenge. For the 32,783 cases, each with eight 
quarters of data, there are 23 different patterns of reported educational attainment across the 
eight quarters. Of the total cases, 16,010 (48.80% of the total) cases have educational 
attainment information in all eight quarters; 14,674 observations do not have any education 
information. These two groups account for 93.60% of the sample. Another 2,099 (6.40%) 
cases provide educational attainment in some quarters. The imputation base is chosen from 
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the 16,010 complete-data observations. For example, there are 110 observations without 
education information in the first year but with at least a high school degree in the second 
year. The number of individuals from the complete-data set with at least a high school degree 
in the second year is 10,652 observations. Therefore, these 10,652 observations are chosen as 
the imputation base for the pattern observed for the 110 observations with no education 
information in the first year. 
The rate of reporting educational attainment ranges between 52.89% and 54.48% in the 
total cases for the eight quarters. Cases reporting at least a high school degree increased from 
31.21% to 35.20% of the total sample. For the 16,010 cases with complete data, the share 
with at least a high school degree increased from 63.90% to 66.98%. Of the complete cases 
(n=16,010), 63.90% (10,230) had at least a high school degree in October 1993, the 
beginning of the period, and 33.02% (5,286) cases did not have a high school degree at the 
end of the two years. Thus, 96.92% of the individuals did not change education category 
during the two-year period. There are twice as many individuals with a high school degree as 
those without one in the group that did not change. A total of 363 (2.27%) and 131 (0.82%) 
cases attained a high school degree in the first and second year, respectively. 
Fractional imputation and jackknife variance estimation 
To impute the educational attainment, we used the fractional imputation method 
described in Kim (2000). We assumed that educational attainment is related to gender, race, 
marital status, an indicator for a metro county, the number of children in the household, 
quarterly wage income, total number of months on FIP, the amount of child support received, 
the county unemployment rate, and county income per capita. For some variables, such as 
marital status and quarterly wage income, the value varies by quarter. We calculated the 
different parameters using the appropriate quarter's value. 
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We calculated the predicted values for educational attainment based on the models for 
both respondents and non-respondents. We used the model based on quarter 1 data to 
compute the probability of a high school degree for patterns with missing data in quarter 1; 
the model based on quarter 2 to compute the probability of high school degree for additional 
missing data in quarter 2, etc. 
The respondents were ordered on the probability of educational attainment in a specific 
quarter computed from the estimated model. Then the respondents were divided into groups 
of size 10. We call these groups "cells." The boundary between the groups is the probability 
value midway between the largest probability value in one group and the smallest probability 
value in the next group. 
The non-respondents are assigned to cells based on their model-estimated probability 
values. Every non-respondent with a probability value that falls within the boundary of a cell 
is assigned to that cell. A set of the 10 respondent educational attainments is given 
("donated") to each non-respondent in the cell. The educational attainment is imputed for 
each of the quarters for which data are missing. Each of the ten imputed vectors is given a 
weight equal to the original weight divided by ten. Given that one is the original weight in 
this data set, we assign 0.1 as the weight for the imputed data. By using fractional imputation, 
the educational values imputed for the non-respondents contain the actual education of the 
respondents in the cell (and hence presume the distribution of these data). The method has 
the benefit of multiple imputation as well as having smaller variation than the Rubin (1987) 
method. 
The sample number of observations for each quarter with at least a high school degree 
after imputation for the whole data set, Y, is 
y= É I w .  (4-1) 
1=1 yes, 
where 
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•9, is the set of donors for individual i. If / is a respondent then 19, =/; if / is a 
non-respondents then S, contains ten donors; 
wy. is the imputed weight of donor j for individual If z is a nonrespondent, then 
there are ten donors and wtj =0.1 for each of the y; if / is a respondent, then w„=l; 
yl is the imputed value from donor j to recipient If i is a respondent then 
y'j = y'„ = y' is the original observation; 
n is the total number of individuals in the sample, which equals 32,783 for the 
total sample. 
The imputed sample mean of educational attainment is 
We treat the whole data set as a simple random sample. The variances of the survey 
statistics are calculated using jackknife variance estimation based on replicate weights 
(Westat, 1998). The jackknife variance estimator of a statistic H is 
where G is the number of replicate weights. (7=100 in our case (see Pan, Fuller, and 
Jensen, 2000 for details) and H(k) is the k-th replicate estimate of H, 6=1,2,.. .,G. 
Note the Jackknife method we used has a 10% error in the imputation component of the 
variance estimator. This is because there are ten respondents in each cell, but the total 
number of replicates is 100. There is a (G-l)G'1 adjustment in the Jackknife computations. 
The 10% bias comes from the difference between 0.9 and 0.99. An adjusted standard error of 
(4.2) 
i=i 
vâr(//) = 2 (H(k)  -  H)(H(k)  - / / ) ' .  (4.3) 
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imputed educational achievement is calculated as the standard error multiplied by the square 
root of0.9 (0.948). 
Descriptive analysis and results from the imputation 
Table 4.1 gives the mean and standard error of education for quarters 1 and 8 for our 
imputed data set. The mean and variance are calculated by the equations (4.2) and (4.3), 
respectively. As shown in the table, the estimated share with education of at least a high 
school degree is 62.14% in October 1993 (Ql) and 65.12% in September 1995 (Q8). 
Compared to data for the complete data set, there are 1.76 percentage points more in the first 
quarter and 1.86 percentage points fewer in the last quarter with at least a high school degree. 
There are 3.08% for the complete data set and 2.98% for the whole data set (including both 
complete data and missing data with imputed educational achievement) who earned at least a 
high school degree at some time in the two-year period. 
The full data set including imputed values was used for the subsequent analysis and 
estimation. As shown in Table 4.1, for all cases (n=32,783), 62.14% of case heads have some 
high school education (the high-skilled group) in the first quarter and 65.12% of case heads 
have some high school education at the end of the two-year period. Following Hoynes's 
(1999) definition, low-skilled workers are defined as case heads without a high school 
degree, and high-skilled workers are defined as case heads with at least a high school degree. 
The higher-skilled group (those with high school education) has an almost 6% larger share of 
whites; the higher-skilled group also has a 1.58% larger share of disabled cases. In addition, 
the higher-skilled group has more married cases, and more cases with one or two children. 
As shown in Table 4.1, in total, nearly 95% of the cases were outside of a rural area in 
October 1993: 53.06% of the cases were in metro areas and 41.95% were in urban areas in 
October 1993. The quarterly wage income and child support were the two major sources of 
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income for the cases in the data set, in addition to FIP. There were 51.11% cases that 
received child support in quarter 1 (100%-46.89%) and 49.41% received the child support in 
quarter 8. The average amount of quarterly child support received for a family with child 
support was $727.16 in the first year and $1,246.28 in the second year. 
Although most of cases did not earn very high wage income in the whole sample, the 
share of cases without wage income fell from 45.13% in the first quarter to 30.49% in the last 
quarter. The share with both child support and wage income in the two years was 36.61% and 
37.15%, respectively. Some economic patterns emerged across time periods: during the 
second quarter (January to March) of each year the unemployment rate is the highest and the 
share without wage income in that quarter is also the highest. 
The average time cases stayed in the FIP and Food Stamp Program during the two-year 
period was about 17 months. Nearly 45% of FIP cases and 42% of food stamp cases left the 
programs some time during the two-year period. The low-skilled group stayed in the 
programs a little longer than did the high-skilled group. 
Table 4.2 gives more detailed information about the cases with children. The sample 
number of observations is calculated according to formula (4.1). The table shows the 
working participation rates for the low-skilled and high-skilled cases with children. There 
exist significant differences between the two skilled groups for the single females. For the 
single females, cases in the high-skilled group have higher labor force participation rates. 
Although the differences between the high-skilled and the low-skilled married groups are 
small, there are differences between single females and married females. Married females 
with children have higher working participation rates than do single females with children. 
The differences in labor participation rate for men in the four groups are not statistically 
different from each other. The participation rates for the females are higher than those for 
males except for the single low-skilled group. 
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As Jensen, Keng, and Garasky (2000) mentioned, all nonmetro areas (urban, rural-
adjacent, and rural non-adjacent) had higher rates of unemployment compared to the metro 
areas, and the urban areas had the highest unemployment rates. They also showed that wage 
income percentages, average wage income, child support percentages, child support levels, 
and FtP or FSP participation were all higher in rural areas. 
Mobility is defined as location change from one county to another county, whether the 
destination is rural, urban, or metro area. According to the data, there are 2,075 and 1,855 
reference persons moving at least once in the first year and in the second year, respectively. 
Table 4.3 shows the mean of the demographic variables according to three mobility patterns. 
As illustrated in the table, the proportion of working for the case heads who move is lower 
than for the case heads who do not move; however, the average wage income is almost the 
same for both categories. These results indicate that case heads who move once actually have 
higher wage income if they get a job. However, the results also indicate that case heads who 
move more than once are not guaranteed a higher wage even if they get a job. Table 4.3 also 
illustrates that case heads who move more than once usually have lower educational 
achievement than do the other two patterns. 
Economic Model 
To serve as a basis for specifying an empirical model, we develop a simple model for 
labor force participation and FIP participation. Low-income households choose whether to 
participate in FIP or not and they simultaneously decide whether to move and participate in 
the labor force. To model the decision, we assume all cases are risk-averse and the utility 
function can be assumed as follows: 
U(L,C,<l>P,rM) (4.4) 
I l l  
where L is leisure time, C is consumption goods, P is an indicator equal to 1 if the household 
participates in FIP and 0 if not, and <j> is the marginal disutility of FIP participation. The 
disutility comes from transaction costs associated with a family filing an application, going 
for interviews, reduced expected future benefits due to a lifetime time limit imposed in FIP, 
and disutility of dealing with welfare bureaucracies and the application procedure (Moffitt, 
1983). M is an indicator equal to 1 if the reference person moves and 0 if not; y includes 
both disutility from mobility such as foregone earnings, the "psychic" costs of changing 
one's environment, and utility gains from moving such as returns from the earning 
differentials between places, increased efficiency in consumption, and place preference. As 
usual, we assume the marginal utility of leisure time and consumption is positive. However, 
the signs for marginal utility of program participation and migration are not clear. Case heads 
may leave FEP even if they are eligible for the program if the disutility from participation is 
higher than utility gain. They also prefer stay to move if the disutility from migration is large. 
The time and income budget constraints for a family are given as follows: 
L + 
" = 
Z (4.5) 
C < (w+Mk)H + N+P(B -  X)  -  MS 
where H is the working time and L is the total available time; w is the wage rate; K is the 
change (increase) in wage because of mobility; N is the nonlabor income; A" is the cost 
associated with FIP program participation; S is the money cost of mobility, which includes 
increases in expenditure for food, lodging, transportation, and costs of driving (In actual 
practice, the cost of mobility may be quite different from one case to another due to the 
personal skills and location); and B is the benefit from the FIP participation. 
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The family chooses H, P,M to maximize utility (4.4) subject to the constraints (4.5). 
Because our data only includes cases eligible for the FIP (specifically, those both eligible and 
who participated in October 1993), the family faces the following set of alternatives at some 
time during the year: 
(1)not employed, moving or not moving, in the FIP, 
(2)employed, moving or not moving, in the FIP, 
(3)not employed, moving or not moving, not in the FIP, 
(4)employed, moving or not moving, not in the FIP. 
Let Vi, V2. Vi. V4 are the indirect utility functions associated with the alternatives (1), (2), 
(3) and (4). The value of receiving FIP in the model is 
V(P = l) = max{Vl(N,B,t,X,S,k,r,M),Y2(H,B,w,H,X,S,t,k,y,M)} (4.6) 
The value of not receiving FIP is 
V{P = 0)  = m^{Vi{N,S,k,y,M),Vi{N,w,H,S,k,Y,M))- (4.7) 
The probability of employment is 
Pr(H > 0) = PT{V2(N,B,w,H,X,</>S,ic,y,M) > %(#,*,%,f,r,r,M)} 
+  P r { V 4 ( N , w ,H , S ,k, r , M)>r 3 ( N , S ,k, r , M ) }  
The probability of FIP exit is 
Pr(P = 0) = Pr{Vx{N,B,<!>,X,S,k,y,M) < V3(N,S,k,y,M)} 
+  P r { V 2 ( N , w , H , S , K , y , M ) < V < ( N , w 1 H , S , / c , r , M ) }  
Empirical Specification 
Variable Definition 
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Definitions and sample mean values of the variables used in the empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 4.4. More details are presented below on the derivation of selected 
variables. 
We derived several local labor market conditions and all individuals who have the same 
county of residence are assigned the same local labor market variables. The county-level 
social-economic characteristics include the following variables: 
(1) Expected and unexpected unemployment rates {PU and DU). Following Tokle and 
Huffman (1991), we derived both predicted and unpredicted unemployment rates to 
measure the local labor market situation, based on the following model: 
E(Ut)=0.585 -0.059*time+0.397*U,.,+0.03*U,.2+0.401 *U,.3 (4.10) 
(0.012) (0.296e-2) (0.372e-2) (0.343e-2) (0.224e-2) 
where time refers to a time trend, which is equal to 1 if the maximum wage quarter is the 
first quarter, 2 if it is the second quarter, 3 if it is the third quarter. £/, is the relative 
unemployment rate at quarter t. The equation was fit with OLS as the Durbin h test 
showed no evidence of autocorrelation (Johnston, 1984 p. 318). The unpredicted 
unemployment rate is derived from the difference between actual unemployment rate at 
time t and the expected unemployment rate E(UJ. 
(2) The change in the share of the county's employment in the service sector (DSER). 
This variable indicates changes in the occupational mix of local labor demand. It is 
defined as the share in t minus share in time t-1. The service category includes 
employment in transportation, finance, insurance and real estate, government, service, 
and wholesale and retail trade. 
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(3) Recent job growth in the county (EMPLL). This is measured by logarithm of the 
ratio of share of employment with total labor force in year t with that in year t-l in the 
county. 
(4) County poverty level (POVER). The indication is measured by the share of 
population under the poverty line in the county. 
Econometric Specification 
As discussed above, the utility of a particular choice depends on the consumption that is 
available if that choice is made. Wage and child support are two of the major sources of 
income in the model. To operationalize the indirect utility function Vf, Vi, Vj, V4, let Wj=wH 
be wage income and Nj be non-wage income (excluding the program benefit. Because of the 
limited data availability, we use child support as a representative of the non-wage income in 
the analysis. Child support is major nonwage income for the population who have been on 
the FIP program) at choice j, we assume indirect utility of case / facing one of the four 
regimes j have the linear form 
Vy =awWj+acNj+/iïpP+flmM+e,y. (4.11) 
Migration within states is one method by which households can take advantage of 
different employment (economic) opportunities. Case-heads will only choose migration if 
they  d i f fer  in  impact  across  the  two areas .  The  ef fec t  o f  the  loca l  economic  s i tua t ion  (A/) ,  
such as predicted and unpredicted unemployment rate, and income per capita are some 
reasons that lead to migration. We expect cases to move from low-income to high-income 
counties and from higher unemployment rate areas to lower unemployment rate areas so that 
they can find a job, earn more wage income and finally leave the FIP. Other demographic 
variables (B\), such as case head's gender, race, marriage status at time t, educational 
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achievement at time t, indicator of children younger than six are some of the migration 
control variables, which affect case head's disutility and utility gained from migration. Given 
these specifications, the predicted probability of mobility (PSTAT) is assumed to be of the 
form 
PSTA T-f(A i, B,)2. (4.12) 
A case head participates in work when his or her reservation wage is less than the 
anticipated market wage. A change in variables that raises the market wage will increase the 
probability of work, and variables that increase the reservation wage will decrease the 
probability of work. For example, Tokle and Huffman (1991) found a strong positive effect 
of an individual's schooling on the probability of work for married farm and nonfarm males 
and females. However, as they mentioned, the effects of local labor market conditions 
depend partially upon expectations. The net effects of anticipated unemployment on the 
probability of wage work depends on change in the individual reservation wage or market 
wage. If expected wage decreases as the unemployment rate increases, the case head will 
2The logistic estimation of migration is shown in the following equation: 
E(PSTAT)=-10.322 -11.456Rural+0.405Income per Capita -0.551RuralxIncomeper 
(1.028) (1.077) (0.045) (0.047) 
Capita-0.439Predicted Unemp. Rate-0.642Pred. Unemp. RatexRural +0.126Unpred. 
(0.077) (0.088) 0.094) 
Unemp. Rate-0.572Unpred Unemp. RatexRural-0.065Age+2.672e-4Age2 -
(0.141) (0.014) (2.32e-4) 
0.017Education+0.801 White-0.405Male+0.134Married+ 0.438WhitexMale 
(0.041) (0.104) (0.402) (0.060) (0.401) 
+0.066Households with child under 6. 
(0.054) 
The predicted results show that households are more likely to move into nonrural, high 
income per capita, low predicted unemployment rate counties. The results also show that 
those with reference persons who are younger, who do not have a high school degree, who 
are white, who are female, who are married, who have a younger child are more likely to 
move. 
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choose more leisure time and thus increase the reservation wage; on the other hand, firms 
that have higher expected unemployment rates will pay higher wage rates if unemployment 
hurts workers rather than firms. 
The probability of working is assumed to depend on the local economic situations (AT), 
such as PU, DU, DSER, EMPLL and demographic variables (B2), such as case-heads' 
education, white, disability, number of children, marriage status. Working might be expected 
to be more difficult if the case-head is single, non-white, and disabled. Children, especially 
younger children, make working more costly because of child-care and job responsibilities. 
The inclusion of number of children in our labor supply model is motivated by the empirical 
findings that the number and age distribution of children have a significant effect on welfare 
recipients' labor supply behavior. As Kim, Orazem and Otto (2001) note, education should 
be positively related to the ease of obtaining information on job openings across labor 
markets. The assumed functional form for the probability of working, is the logistic model 
with Jackknife variance estimation, and is specified as 
Pr(H>0)=f(A2,B2,PSTAT). (4.13) 
The potential wage one can earn is measured by the predicted maximum wage, or m ax-
wage. We choose the max-wage as a measure of labor market opportunities because labor 
force and FIP participation are jointly determined. The max-wage is computed for the year 
using the quarterly wages for the individual. The quarter in which max-wage occurs is called 
the max-wage quarter. For those who did not work when we collected the data, we chose 
quarter three (April-June) as a representative quarter because this quarter is the one where 
most of the max-wage cases occurred (40.11% in quarter three and 36.03% in quarter four). 
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The max-wage quarter indicator is used to choose the independent and dependent variables 
for  the  model .  The  predic ted  potent ia l  wage  a lso  depends  on  loca l  economic  var iab les  (A s ) ,  
which include location (METUR), EMPLL, PU, DU, DSER, individual demographic 
variables (Bj) such as case head age, gender, race, education, and the Inverse Mills Ratio (C/) 
which captures the data selection effects (Green, 1997). The local economic variables are 
used to represent local labor market conditions. The unemployment rate, current job growth 
rate influences bargaining power in wage negotiations. Age, gender, disability, education, 
and other demographic variables represent the individual working experience and personal 
skills. Because the data contain wages of only those case heads who choose to work, 
Heckman's (1979) two-stage method is employed to correct for the resulting selection bias. 
The wage equation conditional on working can be estimated according to the following 
equation: 
Log(Wj\H>0)=/o+//Aj+^2Bj+ /jC/. (4.14) 
An exit is said to occur for the year when an FIP recipient leaves (or is out of) the 
program for at least two months consecutively in a year, which is defined as 
fl if household leaves FIP during the year 
n  =  i  ( 4 , 1  J )  [O otherwise 
Selective variables are examined for their effects on the probability of exit. Local 
employment opportunity (A4) such as predicted and unpredicted unemployment rate, local 
poverty measurement, current job growth rate, and individual variables (B4) such as case 
heads' age (working experience), educational achievement, white, gender, mobility (PSTAT) 
will increase the possibility of working and also will increase wage income. The possibilities 
of working make households more eligible to stay in the FIP program. However, increases in 
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wage income make households less eligible for the program. The net effect of working on 
program exit status is, a priori, ambiguous. Wage income and non-wage income (exclude the 
program benefit) both make the households less likely to participate the program. However, 
because wage income is more related to program participation than non-wage income, we 
expect that wage income have larger effects on program participation. To solve the 
endogenous of wage and program participation, we used predicted potential wage instead of 
the real wage income in the exit equation. To estimate the effects of local economic situation 
and individual information on program exit status, which we use a logistic model with 
jackknife variance estimation, the following equation can be used to specify the model: 
Pr(P,=1) =f(A4,B4, W,N, PSTA T). (4.16) 
Empirical results 
The estimated coefficients for the probability of working, potential wage, and being off 
FIP in the next quarter are reported in Table 4.5. The first stage (the first column in the 
Table) indicates the predicted coefficients on the case head's relative utility from selecting 
working versus not working option. Results that allow differential utility across the FIP 
whether exiting or staying are presented in the third column. 
Probability of labor participation 
We include several county variables in the model of probability of working. The 
location is statistically significant at the 1% level. The result indicates that people living in 
the non-rural areas (i.e., metro and urban areas) are more likely to have a job than those 
living in rural areas. Many observers have suggested that low unemployment rates in an 
expanding economy indicate that welfare recipients who are able and who want to work 
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should be able to find a job (Goetz et al. 1999), not surprisingly, our results show that in an 
expanding economy welfare recipients who are able and who want to work should be able to 
find a job. The effect of expected unemployment rate in the county is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level and unexpected unemployment rate is positive related 
to the probability of working. These results can be explained by the individuals' reservation 
wage and the relatively low unemployment rate in Iowa during this time period. The negative 
expected unemployment rate effect suggests that cases are relatively more likely to lose their 
jobs (or not find jobs) when the local labor force market becomes worse. The significant 
unexpected unemployment rate may be related with the lag effects for the unexpected local 
labor market changes. Also the positive and significant effect of an increase locally of the 
share of service jobs implies that cases are more likely in the area to get service jobs. The 
result also implies that job training is needed to create the incentives for cases to invest in 
skills and change occupations. Although service jobs includes a wide range of skills from 
motel and restaurant staff to investment bankers, many of the jobs are low paying and low 
skill jobs. 
Gender and race were evaluated for the four combinations (white and male, white and 
female, nonwhite and male, nonwhite and female). The results show that those who are male 
and those who are white are most likely to work; whites have the highest probability of 
working. Female nonwhite case heads is the group least likely to be working. For those who 
are disabled, it is more difficult (and not required under FIP regulation) to get a job. Our 
results show consistently that the probability of working is lower for disabled persons than 
for able-bodied persons. 
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Being married and having a larger number of children in the family both increase the 
probability of working. Parents with a larger number of children have more pressure to earn 
money so that they can support their family. However, the probability of working will 
decrease if the case heads have children younger than 6 years old. The results relate to the 
fact that childcare costs are relatively higher for children under age 6 and may exceed 
possible earnings. 
For a long time, policymakers and economists have considered education a major factor 
in determining success in finding a job. Not surprisingly, the positive effects education show 
that the probabilities of working for low-skilled cases are lower than those for the high-
skilled cases. At the same time, we expect mobility and change of location also to be 
associated with obtaining a job. The positive sign for the (predicted) probability of mobility 
(between counties) in the equation indeed shows that this is the case. The negative sign of the 
coefficient on the number of active months in FIP during the last two quarters indicates that 
these persistent welfare cases are less likely to get a job. 
Potential wage prediction 
We include several county-level variables in the model for predicted wage in order to 
capture the effects of the local economic environment. Both the predicted and unpredicted 
unemployment rate are negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Evaluated at sample 
mean, the point estimator of elasticities of predicted unemployment rate is -0.63 and 
unpredicted unemployment rate is -0.11 for nonrural areas. And the point estimators for rural 
areas are a bit larger: -0.78 for predicted employment rate and -0.16 for the unpredicted 
unemployment rate. The results imply that a 1% increase in a county's predicted 
unemployment rate was associated with a 0.63% decline in wage income in non-rural areas 
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and a 0.78% decrease in rural areas. A 1% increase in unpredicted employment rate would 
cause a 0.11% and 0.16% decrease in wage income in nonrural areas and rural areas, 
respectively. The results show that the predicted unemployment rate has a larger effect on 
wage income than that from the unexpected unemployment rate. At the same time, both 
predicted unemployment and predicted unemployment rates have larger effects on the wage 
income of rural households than those of nonrural households. 
The effects of individual characteristic (gender and race) can be determined from the 
direct and indirect terms. Among individual characteristics, the results show that being white 
is positively related to higher potential wages. The results indicate that the potential wage for 
a white male (in the FIP population) is 158.33% that of a nonwhite male. Nonwhite females 
earn the lowest wage in the four groups. The results also show that males earn higher wages 
than females. The results are consistent with those of Waldfogel and Mayer (1999). In their 
study they evaluate gender differentials in employment, annual earnings, hours worked, and 
hourly wages. 
Age is one of the significant variables in the wage model. The results show that 
potential wage increases as the age of the case heads approaches 62 years old and decrease 
after age 62. These results indicate that FIP recipients who remain employed before the age 
of 62 can indeed expect steady wage growth, a result expected as wages grow with job 
experience. 
One of the objectives of welfare reform is to encourage financial independence and self-
sufficiency for recipients. It is reasonable to assume that the participants will leave the 
program if they achieve these goals. The negative sign for the number of active months they 
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stayed in the program in the last six months shows that it is difficult to achieve these 
objectives: people with relatively more FIP support receive lower wages. 
The statistical significance of the inverse Mill's ratio shows that the selection problem 
on labor market participation is important here. The results suggest that we need to consider 
the problem of selection when predicting the max-wage; otherwise the results are biased to 
the fact that we only observe those who work when we collect the data on wages. 
Indicator variables for the max-wage quarter and year are all statistically significant. 
The results show that the potential wage is lower than other times if the max-wage quarter is 
between October and December. At the same time, the wage at the end of the two-year 
period was higher than that between October 1993 and September 1994 (the first year). 
Probability of FIP exit 
The county variables that are statistically significant in the equation predicted FIP exit 
are the expected and unexpected unemployment rate, the ratio of the population in poverty, 
and an interaction term between location (non-rural) and the county employment share of 
service industry. The effect of the county predicted unemployment rate in non-rural areas is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in predicting being out of FIP during the 
year. The negative sign shows that individuals are more likely to stay in FIP in the counties 
with higher predicted (expected) unemployment rates than in other counties with lower 
unemployment rates. However, the effect of the unexpected unemployment rate on FIP exit 
is positive. Once again, it suggests that the unexpected unemployment rate increase has a 
lagged effect on program participation. The change in the county's share of employment in 
the service industry is also a significant variable in non-rural areas: cases are more likely to 
leave the program if the county has a relatively higher share of the increase in new service 
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industry job opportunities. The results also show that the possibility of staying in the FIP is 
higher in the poorer counties than that in relatively richer counties. 
Not surprisingly, the positive sign for predicted max-wage shows that the higher the 
potential wage made by the case heads, the more likely the case head is to leave FIP. 
However, given the potential wage and other factors, education does not significantly affect 
the FIP status though it has the positive sign. The results showed that cases with male and 
white heads are more likely leave the FIP than cases with nonwhite and female heads. These 
results are considered with previous studies on welfare participation that find that higher 
wage income, being male, and being white are characteristics related to higher exit rates. For 
example, Brandon (1995) and Sandefur and Cook (1997) found that important determinants 
of recidivism (returning to welfare) include having fewer years of education, not being 
married, and having little job experience. 
The effect of child support on the FIP status is a little different from that of wage 
income. The results show that there are significant differences between low-skilled and high-
skilled groups related to child support, but there is no significant difference between rural 
and non-rural areas. A case head with a high school degree, higher child support, and living 
in a non-rural area is more likely to leave the FIP. 
We expected that FIP participants would move to obtain a job and that along with the 
change in location would come a change in FIP status. Results show that the predicted 
probability of moving has a statistically significant effect on the FIP exit. As expected, case 
heads who move are more likely to leave FIP. 
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Marginal Effects 
Marginal effects of the continuous regressors on the probability of wage work and being 
FIP leaver are evaluated at the sample mean and reported in Table 4.6. 
The upper half of the Table includes the marginal effects of variables on the probability 
of leaving FIP. The marginal effects of predicted and unpredicted unemployment rate on the 
probability of leaving FIP are larger when individuals live in rural areas than that in nonrural 
areas. The results show that the probability of leaving FIP decreases 0.08 percent for rural 
cases and 0.07 percent for nonrural cases if expected unemployment rate increases by 1 
percent; the probability of leaving FIP increases 0.02 percent for non-rural cases and 0.04 
percent for rural cases if the unexpected unemployment rate increases by 1 percent. The 
share of employment in the service industry has larger effects on both probability of work 
and leaving the FIP in nonrural areas than that in rural areas. The results show that a yearly 
double increase in the county's share of service industry employment increases the 
probability of leaving FIP 2 percent for non-rural cases and decreases 0.06 percent for rural 
area. It implies that case heads are more likely to work in the service industry when they live 
in metro or urban areas than when they live in rural areas. The results may relate with the fact 
that case heads living in rural area may have more stable jobs than those living in nonrural 
areas. The share of poverty population in the county's total population almost has the same 
effect on the probability of leaving FIP. The elasticity of job growth rate is not statistically 
significant. 
The elasticities of predicted wage income imply that double increase in wage income 
increases the probability of leaving FIP by 0.85 percent for nonrural, high-skilled cases; 0.82 
percent for nonrural, low-skilled cases; 0.93 percent for rural, high-skilled cases; and 0.90 
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percent for rural, low-skilled cases. Similarly, the elasticities of child support imply that 
double increase in child support increases the probability of leaving FIP 0.07 percent for 
nonrural, high-skilled cases; 0.04 percent for nonrural, low-skilled cases; 0.09 for rural, high-
skilled cases; 0.06 for rural, low-skilled cases. The results imply that wage income has a 
larger effect on program participation than do the effects of non-wage income such as child 
support; the effects of income are different between cases in rural areas and those in non-
rural areas. The effects of child support are also different between cases with a high school 
degree and cases without a high school degree. However, the elasticity difference of wage 
income between cases with high school degree and those without are small. 
The lower part of the Table provides the marginal effects of some regressors on the 
probability of working. The results show that the probability of being jobless increase 0.002 
percentage for rural households and 0.001 percentage for non-rural households if expected 
unemployment rate double increases. However, double increasing unexpected unemployment 
rate increases the probability of having a job 0.03 percent for non-rural case heads and 0.13 
percent for rural case heads. The effect of an increase in the share of service industry on 
nonrural cases is more than two times of that on rural cases. The effect of a growth in wage 
and salary jobs in a nonrural county is not statistically significant. 
The Table also provides marginal effects of other variables. The results show that 
increase one child in the household can increase the case head's working probability 1.28e-4 
percent; one month increase in the last half year FIP participation increases the probability of 
working by 2.21e-5 percent. The results also show that one unit increase in the probability of 
migration can increase probability of working 9.40e-7 percent and the probability of leaving 
FIP by 1.35e-3 percent. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In the study, we use fractional imputation to fill in the missing educational status in the 
data set and examine the relationship between welfare participation and employment to 
evaluate the factors that affect labor participation, potential wage, and FIP participation. The 
evidence shows declining caseloads and increasing work effort among single mothers. Those 
who are nonwhite are less likely to work and when working, receive lower wages. 
Educational attainment (of a high school degree) is one of the major factors determining 
labor participation, especially for single parents. We find that the unemployment rate, 
unemployment shocks, the share increase of service employment, the job growth rate are 
some of the significant variables for low-income family labor participation. Our results also 
show that labor force mobility is one method for welfare recipients to get a job. These results 
indicate that local economic conditions do indeed affect labor force participation of low-
income families. 
Analysis of potential wages shows those who are white, who are married, and who have 
higher education have a higher potential wage. Local labor markets, as indicated by predicted 
and unpredicted unemployment rate, also affect the potential wage. 
The analysis of the FIP exit shows that higher potential wage income has a significant 
and positive effect on FIP status. The results suggest that the objectives of welfare reform 
should not only include getting a job but also should support earning more wage income. 
Change in wage income has a greater effect on FIP status than does child support. Assistance 
with moving may help recipients to achieve the aim of self-sufficiency. The results indicate 
that wage incentives are likely to be particularly effective in reducing the welfare program 
participation. At the same time, it is important to recognize that barriers to employment, such 
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as having young children at home, limit these low-income individuals' move into the labor 
market. 
Location is one of the variables that affect the labor force participation, potential wage, 
and the FIP status. In general, cases living in non-rural counties are more likely to find a job 
but earn a lower potential wage. The results presented here suggest that local socioeconomic 
situation have the larger effects on probability of working in nonrural households than rural 
households. However, the results suggest that local socioeconomic situation have the larger 
effects on welfare program participation and wage income for rural households than those of 
nonrural households. The results imply that wage income is more related with program 
participation than the probability of working. Exiting from FIP will be limited in areas with 
high unemployment rates, especially for those living in rural areas. Relatively more service 
job opportunities increase the possibility of getting a job, especially for those living in non-
rural area. The results provide evidence that job holding and benefits (wage) could be better 
for FIP residents in some areas than others and indicate the importance of demographic and 
other factors in determining the economic outcomes for these low-income cases. 
Findings related to education show that those with higher education are more likely to 
get a job and to earn higher wages. The benefits of higher education also magnify the 
positive effects of higher child support and higher wage income in leaving FIP. It is difficult 
for low-skilled people to achieve the goals of welfare reform. The findings on the effect of 
education reiterate the need to train the low-skilled group so that they can acquire skills to get 
a job and earn more income. The different prospects for high-skilled and low-skilled welfare 
recipients remind us that the design of welfare policy programs should consider the 
characteristics of the welfare recipients and the nature of jobs available to less-skilled 
workers. 
The empirical analyses presented here provide an indication of the effects of welfare 
reform, observed in a state that adopted a welfare share similar to those later adopted when 
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national rules changed. Because we cannot separate economic growth factors from program 
and policy effects by using the administrative data during this short time period, we do not 
know whether the behavior of the FIP recipients will change if they face a more difficult 
economic climate. We do find evidence that some programs for education, job training, and 
assistance with mobility will have positive returns relative to the objectives of welfare 
reform. 
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Table 4.1 Family Investment Program caseload statistics 
Demographic Variable Quarter 1 Quarter 8 
Total Caseloads 32,783 32,783 
Educational Attainment: 
With a high school degree 0.621 0.651 
(Standard, error) (0.004) (0.004) 
Areas of Residence: 
Metro 0.531 0.565 
Urban 0.042 0.393 
Rural 0.050 0.042 
Number of Children 2.171 2.272 
(Standard, error) (1311) (1.312) 
No Child 0.320e-2 1.08Oe-2 
Less than Three Children 0.685 0.649 
Married 0.195 0.234 
Single Father 0.391 0.415 
Family Quarterly Wage Earnings:($100) 16.472 26.981 
(Standard error) (14.911) (18.971) 
No Wage Income (%) 45.132 30.492 
Mean Child Support 313.952 583.472 
(Standard error) (14.4322) (7.032) 
No Child Support (%) 46.892 50.591 
Local Quarterly Unemployment Rate (%) 3.741 3.262 
Gender and Ethnicity: 
White 0.846 
Female 0.907 
Disabled 0.236 
Male x Disabled 0.322 
Female x Disabled 0.204 
Male xDisabled xWhite 0.027 
White x Female 0.766 
White x Male 0.080 
Months Stayed in FIP 17.140 
(Standard error) (0.040) 
1-6 Months (%) 13.333 
7-12 Months (%) 15.981 
13-18 Months (%) 15.731 
19-24 Months (%) 54.955 
Months Stayed in the Food Stamp 16.99 
(Standard error) (0.051) 
0 Months (%) 7.611 
1-6 Months (%) 8.852 
7-12 Months (%) 12.231 
13-18 Months (%) 13.501 
19-24 Months (%) 57.809 
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Table 4.2 Labor force participation for case* with children 
Quarters 
Single 
Low-skilled High-skilled 
Total Ratio(%) Total Ratio(%) Total 
Low-
Married 
skilled High-skilled 
Ratio(%) Total Ratio(%) 
Male: 
Quarter 1 
Quarter 2 
Quarter 3 
Quarter 4 
Quarter 5 
Quarter 6 
Quarter 7 
Quarter 8 
654.300 
602.900 
591.100 
583.700 
593.300 
572.800 
566.600 
561.800 
55.831 
51.652 
60.111 
65.441 
65.033 
61.854 
66.132 
67.522 
1089.100 
1085.100 
1071.900 
1070.800 
1137.700 
1073.200 
1073.400 
1074.200 
53.864 
50.471 
57.812 
63.882 
64.892 
61.383 
65.522 
66.633 
443.900 
429.600 
428.700 
434.900 
403.500 
418.700 
420.400 
420.800 
52.351 
52.844 
60.043 
62.910 
62.351 
63.122 
65.203 
67.322 
828.900 
890.400 
893.300 
906.100 
858.500 
919.300 
923.600 
924.200 
55.582 
52.791 
60.744 
66.483 
64.581 
64.800 
67.010 
69.322 
Female: 
Quarter 1 9415.300 51.061 15143.000 54.354 
Quarter 2 8755.900 48.522 14992.100 52.701 
Quarter 3 8648.700 54.622 14928.300 58.383 
Quarter 4 8582.000 59.551 14977.500 62.822 
Quarter 5 8714.100 61.491 15515.900 64.811 
Quarter 6 8392.900 60.102 14996.100 63.901 
Quarter 7 8350.100 64.033 14955.900 67.542 
Quarter 8 8270.900 66.081 14924.100 69.221 
1864.700 
1961.500 
1970.700 
2019.200 
1794.600 
2039.700 
2047.200 
2068.700 
63 
61 
66 
71 
71 
70 
73 
74 
.422 
584 
962 
623 
171 
792 
160 
891 
3239.800 
3875.500 
3895.300 
3971.800 
3517.400 
4079.300 
4127.800 
4183.300 
63.822 
63.301 
67.713 
70.822 
70.562 
71.889 
75.300 
76.011 
Note: Participation rates between high and low skilled group are significant at 1% level. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of selected demographic variables among mobility patterns (standard deviation in parenthesis) 
Mobility Pattern 
Zero Moves Per Year One Move Per Year More Than One Move Per Year 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 
Variable N=30,708 N=30,928 N=1,787 N=1,596 N=288 N=259 
Number of children 2.178 2.243 2.121 2.249 1.879 2.301 
(1.301) (1.321) (1.209) (1.209) (1.070) (1.379) 
Month in FIP 10.060 7.032 10.221 7.658 10.396 7.880 
(3.231) (5.145) (2.874) (4.567) (2.499) (4.287) 
Proportion of working 25.713 20.237 18.858 13.597 14.931 13.514 
(43.706) (40.178) (39.129) (34.286) (35.701) (34.253) 
Annual wage income 14674.952 17215.049 14742.120 16448.644 12083.102 17120.556 
(13763.047) (15126.480) (13221.600) (14602.452) (12110) (16906.324) 
Proportion with high 63.858 65.055 64.533 64.493 60.243 55.753 
school degree (48.042) (47.681) (47.855) (47.869) (49.025) (49.764) 
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Table 4.4. Descriptive statistic» for variable» used in the regression 
Variable Description Mean Std. Error 
Dependent Variables 
Move 
Work 
Log(wage) 
FIP Leaver 
Independent Variables 
County Characteristics 
Predicted Unemployment 
Unpredicted Unemployment 
LOG(job growth) 
Service job growth 
Poverty population share 
Rural 
Individual Characteristics 
Indicator for the case head moving in the 
quarter before the max-wage quarter 0.334 
Indicator for the case head working or not 
working in the year 0.226 
Wage & salary earnings in the max-wage 
quarter for the case head (log) 0.889 
Indicator for FIP exit during the year 0.219 
0.080 
0.206e-03 
6.412e-03 
1.894e-03 
Predicted unemployment rate in the max-
wage quarter (%) 
Unpredicted unemployment rate in the max-
wage quarter(%) 
Growth in wage and salary jobs (log) over 
last year 
County's share of increase of service industry 
employment in year (%) 
Share of poverty population in county's total 
population per year (%) 
3.571 
-0.575 
2.155e-02 
5.666e-03 
10.926 
Rural and non-rural indicator (non-rural=1) 0.950 
4.343e-03 
1.507e-03 
7.832e-05 
3.470e-03 
1.154e-02 
0.120 
Age Age of case head 31.360 5.209e-02 
Indicator of whether case head has a high 
Education school degree (Yes=1 ) 0.644 4.258e-03 
White Indicator of case-head is white (Yes=1 ) 0.845 1.910e-03 
Male Indicator of male case-head (Yes=1 ) 9.1ÔOB-O2 1.633e-03 
Disable Indicator for disabled case-head (Yes=1 ) 0.236 2.401e-03 
Number of children Number of children in the family 2.208 7.179e-03 
With child less 6 Indicator for having a child younger than six 0.430 2.779e-03 
Married Indicator of being married (Yes-1 ) 0.224 2.392e-03 
Child support received for the max-wage 
Child support quarter ($) 125.583 0.151 
Number of active months in FIP in six months 
Months in FIP preceding max-wage quarter 4.599 9.994e-03 
Prob. of moving Predicted probability of moving 3.132e-03 2.424e-05 
Log(Predicted wage) Predicted max-wage (log) 0.883 1.779e-03 
Indicator for max-wage quarter in second 
Quarter 2 quarter 0.882 1.108e-03 
Indicator for max-wage quarter in third 
Quarter 3 quarter 0.388 2.288e-03 
Indicator for max-wage quarter in forth 
Quarter 4 quarter 0.337 1 683e-03 
Indicator for the sample between Oct. 1993 
Year93 and Sep. 1994 0.500 2.762e-3 
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Table 4.5 Regression result» for working, wage income and FIP participation 
Dependent Variables 
Work Loci(waae) FIP leaver 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Intercept 2.540"* 0.248 1.900"* 0.121 5.663*** 0.523 
County Characteristics 
Predicted Unemp -0.373"* 0.058e -0.177"* 0.025 -0.478"* 0.075 
Unpredicted Unemp 0.267*** 0.046 -0.195*** 0.022 0.237"* 0.062 
Service job growth 6.828e-2" 0.034 2.171e-3 1.645e-2 0.036 0.040 
LOGG'ob growth) 1.476 1.924 4.727e-3 0.868 0.430 2.357 
Rural 0.649" 0.248 0.166* 0.097 1.129"* 0.520 
Poverty population share -0.144*** 0.026 
Ruralx Predicted Unemp 0.103* 0.060 -0.041* 0.024 9.240e-3 8.057e-2 
RuralxUnpredicted Unemp 0.289*** 0.049 -0.076*** 0.023 -8.729e-2 6.138e-2 
Ruralx Service job growth 0.091 0.035 -7.658e-3 0.016 0.094" 0.043 
Ruralx Log(job growth) 2.769 1.962 1.097 0.911 0.672 2.363 
Ruralx Poverty pop share -5.631 e-3 2.749e-2 
Individual Characteristics 
Age 0.029"* 2.829e-3 
AgexAge -2.320e-3*** 0.404e-4 
Education 0.125"* 0.027 0.032*** 0.012 0.169 0.112 
White 0.425"* 0.033 0.193"* 0.018 1.415*** 0.046 
Male 0.122 0.108 0.121" 0.059 0.550"* 0.133 
WhitexMale 0.239" 0.116 -0.115* 0.064 -0.757*** 0.130 
Disable -0.274"* 0.028 
Number of children 0.264*** 0.011 
With child less than six -0.265*" 0.011 
Married 0.268*** 0.030 
Months in FIP -0.045*** 5.40e-03 -0.052"* 0.262e-2 
Prob. of moving 1.938*** 2.149e-4 8.629e-3*** 4.827e-4 
Log(Predicted wage) 5.770"* 0.321 
Educx Log(Predicted wage) 0.183" 0.088 
Ruralx Log(Predicted wage) -0.537* 0.312 
Log(child support) 0.038"* 0.011 
Educx Log(child support) 0.018*** 4.403e-3 
Ruralx Log(child support) -0.013 0.011 
Quarter 2 0.127*** 2.764e-2 
Quarter 3 0.107*** 1.468e-2 
Quarter 4 0.162"* 0.015 
Year93 -0.153"* 0.027 -0.123*** 0.014 -0.142*** 0.030 
Inverse Mills Ratio -6.193"* 0.186 
R square 0.078 
-2Likelihood 7000.444 68930.803 
Method Logit Linear Logit 
Note: *** significant at 1% level; * at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Table 4.6 Marginal effect» of continuous variable» of leaving FIP and working 
Whole Non-rural Rural 
Effects on FIP leaver: 
Predicted unemployment 
Unpredicted unemployment 
Service job growth 
Log(job growth) 
Poverty population share 
Probability of moving 
Log(predicted wage): 
High-skilled 
Low-skilled 
Log(child support): 
High-skilled 
Low-skilled 
1.352e-5 
-0.734e-3 
0.230e-3 
0.153e-3 
0.173e-3 
-0.234e-3 
0.848e-2 
0.820e-2 
6.561e-5 
3.815e-5 
-0.803e-3 
0.398e-3 
0.612e-5 
0.724e-3* 
-0.242e-3 
0.929e-2 
0.904e-2 
8.647e-5 
5.901 e-5 
Effects on working: 
Predicted unemployment 
Unpredicted unemployment 
Service job growth 
Logtiob growth) 
-1.296e-6 
2.711e-6 
7.71 Oe-7 
2.059e-5* 
-1.794e-6 
1.309e-6 
3.312e-7 
7.159e-6 
Probability of moving 
Note: * not significant at 10%. 
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S. CONCLUSIONS 
The three dissertation essays investigate the relationship among food security status, 
welfare program participation and food away from home consumption. The first two studies 
examine the effects of family structure and income sources on FSP participation and food 
away from home based on different food security status. The third paper analyzes the effects 
of local labor market and migration on FIP participation. 
The findings obtained here help to explain the different consumption and program 
participation behavior for households in different food security status. Number of children in 
the household and wage income (working hours) have the strongest effects on FSP 
participation. Relatively larger marginal effects on FSP participation for households with 
food insecurity or hunger than those of food secure households imply that younger children 
(under 14) and working possibility are more important to the decision to leave the FSP for 
food insecure or hungry households than for food secure households. Family structure also 
has strong effects on food away from home. For the food secure households, working 
families and families with older children (older than 6) have strong possibility of eating out. 
Families with more older family members do not eat out very often but spend more than 
families with fewer older family members if they do indeed eat out. These results are all 
consistent with the expectation. For the households with food insecurity, the consumption 
behavior is not as clear as for those with food security. However, those households with more 
older children (older than 6) and working family members still have the high possibility of 
eating out. 
Local labor market and migration have the strong effects on FIP participation. 
Econometric analysis showed that there are different effects of local economic situation on 
136 
program participation for the households living in rural area compared to those living in non-
rural areas. Migration not only helps low-income families to get a job, but also forces them to 
make a choice between participating in the welfare program and leaving or not even 
participating in the program in the first place. The effects of local labor market on FIP 
participation tells us that participation rates will increase when the local economic situation 
becomes worse, especially for those living in rural areas. The results also imply that the 
declining trends of welfare program participation are caused at least partly by the policy 
changes. 
The issue of food security and welfare program participation is an interesting policy 
issue in poverty analysis. Currently, the USA has experienced recession after more than ten 
years growth. There is great need for research to guide policymakers in understanding the 
reasons for and consequences of the welfare program participation behavior. The first two 
studies identified the importance of family structure and income sources on FSP participation 
and food consumption behavior. The findings of the third study point to local labor market 
effects and migration status as important determinants of cash assistance program (one of 
them is FIP) participation. The results highlight the importance of local economic 
development, family structure and income source considerations when designing policies to 
support the low-income households. 
The results also emphasize the importance of other demographic variables. The findings 
of the three papers show that education not only affects welfare program participation, but 
also affects the consumer's food consumption behavior. Other variables such as location, 
race, gender, disability, marriage status, and age of reference persons also affect the low-
income households program participation and consumption decisions. One explanation for 
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the importance of these variables is due to different lifestyles and ability to manage 
household resources. These results also suggest that the welfare program design and change 
at least should consider the effects of demographic differences. 
Despite considerable and careful research that has significantly advanced our 
understanding of food security and welfare program participation, that understanding remains 
limited in several important respects. First, the dissertation did not consider the important of 
dynamics and uncertainty in the effects of welfare program participation and food 
consumption behavior. Also, because the motivations and modalities of welfare programs 
have been changing rapidly over the past decade and they will change again when the 
environment changes, historical experience may not be an especially accurate predictor of 
future performance. Second, the results provided here are based on the measurement of food 
security. However, the measurement method is still developing based on research to date, 
however, we expect the food secure measurement based on Rasch model to be a valid and 
useful measure of food security status. 
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